London Wallpaper: PAKISTANI PILOTS DID MISSIONS AGAINST USSR AND POSSIBLY CHINA ON BEHALF OF US IN 1960S

PAKISTANI PILOTS DID MISSIONS AGAINST USSR AND POSSIBLY CHINA ON BEHALF OF US IN 1960S

Letter to the Editor – Book review of Flight of the Falcon

Dr Jamid Hussain

April 15, 2010

In my review of Air Commodore ® Sajad Haider's book 'Flight of the Falcon', I made the mistake of stating that there was no connection of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) with U.S. intelligence gathering mission in 1960s. I was wrong. In 1960s, RB-57s of Pakistan Air Force No 24 Squadron flew some missions against Soviet Union and possibly China on behalf of U.S.

Intelligence operations in every country are compartmentalized for obvious reasons of security and sometimes we need information from a variety of sources to put the pieces of the puzzle together. Even first hand witnesses will know only about their own area of responsibility and may not be aware of the activities of other members. Despite diligent work, our conclusions will have significant limitations and additional information can correct or improve the narrative. In addition, our choice of words can make a big difference. In the light of new information available to me courtesy of many, I have summarized the issue in the next few paragraphs.

In summary, U.S. intelligence gathering mission in late 1950s and 1960s from Pakistan included;

1- Electronic surveillance of Soviet Union from Badaber base near Peshawar. This operation was run by National Security Agency (NSA) and US Air Force and US Army special services departments. Surveillance from this facility was from static electronic equipment and didn't include any aircraft although the facility did track surveillance flights as well as kept a tab on Soviet air defense systems during these flights. Operational area of this facility was off limits to Pakistanis therefore no Pakistani participated in this operation. However, commander of secretive 215 Intelligence Squadron of Pakistan Air Force (PAF), a Wing Commander rank officer coordinated with Americans at the base and some India specific information was shared with Pakistanis. One liaison officer from Pakistan army also had access to the base.

2- U-2 surveillance flights over Soviet territory operating from Peshawar air base as well as Lahore. This operation was run by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with cooperation from U.S. Air Force. NSA installed some of the listening devices on U-2. Pakistan provided restricted areas at Peshawar and Lahore for U-2 flights originating from these cities.

3- RB-57 high altitude aircraft. PAF had No 24 Squadron based at Peshawar. This squadron had two RB-57 Fs and two RB-57 Bs. This squadron was manned and operated by PAF although its existence was classified. Pakistan used these surveillance aircraft against its main rival India for electronic (ELINT), signal (SIGINT) and photo (PHOTINT). No U.S. personnel operated these planes although U.S. technicians installed and removed specialized equipment before and after the missions flown against Soviet Union. After landing, American technicians would remove the equipment. Later, India specific information was shared with Pakistan. RB-57 Fs may have been leased to Pakistan by U.S. with the understanding that PAF will fly some missions on U.S. behalf for intelligence gathering against Soviet Union and possibly China. In 1960s, U.S. was interested in progress of Indian nuclear program. In view of intelligence interests of Pakistan and U.S. converging on nuclear factor in India, it is likely that some reconnaissance missions over India as well as air sampling missions of nuclear debris may have been conducted by Pakistani RB-57s and information shared between two countries.

I stand corrected and educated on the issue and offer an unconditional apology to Air Commodore® Sajad Haider for my error. I thank many respected officers for their input pointing to my mistakes, omissions and a critical review as well as confirming other facts. After every such endeavor, I come out humbled, educated and enriched.

'Fools admire, but men of sense approve.' Alexander Pope

Warm Regards,

Hamid Hussain

April 15, 2010

………………………………………………………………….

Air Commodore ® Sajad Haider Response

Dear Hamid,

These are the notes detailing my rationale for simplified comments in the book. You will agree that such marathon details can not be accommodated for limit of size of the book. But just to let you know that I had researched each and every aspect very diligently and then compressed in to narratives which would keep the reader's interest. These were written the day I received your review so you may find some repetition since our communication link was established, but just for your record as I know your deftness and attention for detail.

First of all I am flattered that you read the book from dust cover to the epilogue and index. I am sure if you browse the book again with the information provided by me and accepted its veracity, you might enjoy re-reading the Flight of the Falcon.

Your comments about my simplified comments on US aid, pros and cons.

My comment referred to about American aid and Pakistan's sovereignty may not have been seen with my holistic perspective. In retrospect the view are fine. My statement was a nationalistic view point and the enduring capitulation to the US for economic and military aid strictly on their terms. Ayub khan did not have to barter the sovereignty without preserving national dignity and integrity. There was no problem receiving military and economic aid but national dignity had to be preserved by not signing on the dotted line of the US diktat that we could not use it against a belligerent India whose Prime Minister Nehru had declared that Pakistan would be on its knees in months after partition and the Akhund Bharat slogan. Pakistan was virtually to be a bulwark against communism vis China and especially the Soviets. The quantum of Military Aid programme was much too miniscule against the communist juggernaut. The PAF high command was concerned about the role and the inadequacy of resources. In view of the threat perception and task as Cento/Seato allies, Asghar Khan and Nur Khan in their operational appreciation had demanded after a thorough staff requirement exercise a total of 700 varying capability aircraft and training over several years. What we got was 162 mixed bag of aircraft. Also, it was on strict US terms of employment without any options. The military aid was never to be used against India except in defense. Could Pakistan armed forced have defended itself and survived against a surprise Indian massive assault and also been able to prove to Uncle SAM and cabal that the India was the aggressor? So then this was to be the deterrent as well as the total force structure to thwart and face threat from Soviet might or a Chinese threat. As far as the pluses of the military aid I have unambiguously stated that we learnt a whole new concept in flight safety, training and armament firing, etc. But we only carried out one time 12-14 week (approximately) conversion on the modern American equipment with outstanding results. That, because the PAF airmen had learnt the art of flying and maintenance from our own dedicated teachers and commanders from the day they donned the blue. This fact is clearly manifest in our flying training and engineering standards as we flew the broken down Tempest aircraft, the Attacker and Sea Furies as detailed in my book. Incidentally, the point is again misleading that the American instructors were teaching us in Pakistan. Never, ever. Not a single USAF pilot or instructor spent a single day with the PAF to impart any kind of flying training or tactics. Even for the F-104 conversion (for which was originally selected by Sadruddin but Harry Misra replaced me with Mervin Middle coat), only three pilots went to the US for a few weeks course and came back to convert and develop ops strategy making around 30 pilots operational. Same was the case with the Mirages and MIG-19s. No flying training was done in France or China, just basic conversion on the type. Hundreds of pilots were then trained locally. Resultantly, I say this with full responsibility that no foreign pilot or instructor ever was assigned to train us to the best of my knowledge. It was our indigenous program to convert the entire PAF on new aircraft. It was the leadership of Asghar Khan , Nur Khan, Rahim Khan, FS Hussain, Mitty Masud, Masroor Hussain as outstanding fighter pilots who created one of the best air forces in the world, indeed with US and western aircraft and technology as well as Chinese (Some what retrograde) equipment. FS Hussain, Mitty Masud, Bill Latif, Butch Ahmed, Jamal, Arshad, Waqar, Aftab, I and a few others were a part of that team who carried out the gigantic task of converting the rest on the F-86. From the lot which figure in my narrative of that particular time, I do not recall AM Zafar Choudary or AVM Saeedullah Khan during that period even though they had come to Germany for T-33 Conversion but returned to Pakistan without attending the combat Crew training in the US on F-86 aircraft. AM Zafar Choudary did command the wing at Sargodha and possibly Saeedullah Khan too, but I did not serve under them at any time during that epoch. Our flying skill and superb maintenance of aircraft was result of swift gestation of US techniques and rabid dedication in a competitive spirit. It was the tenacity and professionalism of our technical staff and men who surprised the Americans with outstanding flying and technical performance. It was this performance factor which compelled the US to give us the much touted but operationally inappropriate F-104, before any other free nation of the world. The U-2 incident and warning by the Soviet leadership to nuke Peshawar if necessary was also a factor. Indeed, we were given ab-initio OJT (Ground Subjects only) at Sargodha by American staff-a one time exercise). Like India had we opted for the British Super marine Swift or meteor or the French fighters which we did later in 70s, only two or three pilots would have converted with that country and then come back to train the rest of the PAF. The credit goes to the PAF sterling leadership of Asghar Khan and Nur khan for what the crews were able to achieve.

The fact which can not be ignored is that I said Aid was unavoidable but it should have not shackled us for all times. Has posterity not proven that to be cruelly true till today? Are we free of US largess even today and do we have any measure of sovereignty? It was corrupt leaders then who lacked vision then and it is worse today. The traded off in the 50s was to secure Ayub Khan's presidency with a super power as god father and to opt for luxury of a bowl full of aid at the cost of national pride, self reliance, potential of the then new nation, its indomitable spirit to innovate through sacrifice which was allowed to be denuded. Did the Chinese ask around with a begging bowl having got independence two years after us from opium eating sleeping millions? What about India, Malaysia, Singapore et all. They took longer to consolidate but had LEADERSHIP which was sincere and lead by their personal example of honesty and patriotism and never compromised national integrity. Their leadership guided their people up into the galaxy of proud and prosperous nations, capitalizing on the ingenuity, self reliance and hard work of their people, sans corruption and bigotry. Pakistan had inherited the legacy of the greatest leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah. But after him our leaders were deficit on all the stellar qualities which our father of the nation had demonstrated through out his life. Had his successors possessed the vision, honesty, courage and integrity to take forward the nation and put their heads down and lead the nation towards self reliance, we would not have traveled down the cliff as we do today. Instead they chose the comfort zone for very selfish reasons, always on the pretense of national interests. We looked great in the sixties; envy of many developing free nations, but on borrowed money, Seville Row suits and fancy cars and dolce vita. The outcome is crystal clear today. Hence my refrain about selling our sovereignty. Hope I have made my case and I rest this part here. Inexorably, I could not afford such lengthy tirade in the book. There just was not enough margin.

No doubt we learnt a new approach to combat and maintenance and my book chronicles that through out when I walk through our conversion in Germany and USA. Today, we have to examine and factor-in to our perception the wider implication on the canvass of Aid in all its manifestation and not merely how we were initiated and who did that.

The other aspect of the US aid and its ramifications manifested itself when the first dictator with poor soldiering record stumbled in to Operation Gibraltar, foolishly thinking that India would not react forcefully. We would not have been pushed in to a senseless war in 1965 by an inept President and his cabal. We have never recovered from that sheer stupidity, morally, economically or diplomatically. Instead of nation building and prosperity for economic stability the billowing over confidence of superior US weapons blinded the inept leadership in to a mess and as we were reaching the critical mass of depleting weapons in September, the US shut the tap. They did the same in 1971. All this time India had the Soviets solidly and overtly standing by them, while US aid poured in to India under economic pretence and even military aid after drubbing from the Chinese in 1962. You have quoted my first Sqdn. Comdr. at the RPAF College, A.Cdre. (Poly) Mansoor Shah about his views on US military aid but the venerable Shah Sahib was talking academics of the aid and its impact at that time. What about the implications and inadequacy of US aid and its long term ramifications, which became crystal clear with the passage of time and is existential spelling nemesis for the future. We had to assimilate the larger and enduring aftermath of American influence on posterity, especially keeping in mind the selfish, corrupt and unpatriotic leadership which was in store for Pakistan.

The U-2

The U-2 Issue has been clarified in your letter to the Editor. I would be most willing to solicit the know how of Wing Commander MS Khan in writing a joint article with you on the role of No. 24 Sqdn and the preceding period of U-2 operations. Hopefully, Mr. Roedad Khan in his next edition would correct his assertion that U-2 flew from Bedaber, which did not even possess a Helipad. The info provide by the Americans you mention who were involved in the U-2 ops is not correct. I had a better view of the project in a conceptual sense but not strategic and technical details. However, it would be appropriate to clarify that W.Cdr. MS Khan was security cleared to visit the US Comm. Intel base and that Major Sattar Choudhary (Later M.General) was assigned with the US Spying base for a long time. However, neither had access to the data processing and analyses part of the activity. But isn't it uncanny that my formation of four saw Gary Powers Take-Off on his last fateful flight. So I don't need to elaborate further on that issue.

Shooting Down of S.Ldr. Iqbal at Rahwali

My comments about the shooting down of Iqbal/Lodhi by our own gun has been agreed by you. It was a great personal loss and I had first hand info on what happened on that fateful day.

Pl. read the narrative of the first strike against Amritsar Radar code-named Fish oil. On 6^th W.Cdr. Shamim was leading the flight and Rashid Mir was the B-57 pilot to be the Path Finder. He aborted over Wazirabad owing to technical malfunction. The formation should have carried on because there was no need to risk a huge B-57, at rather low speed, holding steady course, over the most highly defended target. Sargodha fighters had not damaged the radar at any time. The next similar mission nearly cost us th B-57 as it was hit by furious ack ack near the Fish-Oil radar site. Finally, it was a B-57 day time raid led by the intrepid Bill Latif and his formation which finally knocked off the radar but unfortunately with civilian casualties; unavoidably owing to the location of the Radar. Incidentally, Jammu radar was extremely important radar for it covered all air ops from Kashmir to Gujranwala. No.19 Sqdn was assigned that target and my formation knocked it off in the very first attack, (Ref: India-Pakistan Air War-By Samir Chopra and Jagan Mohan).

Your comment about gallantry awards is fully endorsed by me unambiguously in the book. I have stated that these were distributed like Eidi and had argued with the Air Chief once during my writing of the book, that awards should have been recommended but awarded after a truth commission had established the veracity of each and every claim. You may have missed that point in my book. In fact, no one has pointified ever in writing as strongly as I have about giving gallantry awards to officers who were shot down by inferior aircraft and another for making up an incredibly fantasy fight with 10 Indian fighters when there were only four and the claimant was not seen by any of the Indian pilots. Also, in East Wing I have strongly objected to the award for the squadron commander who never flew a mission in war after 7^th September and claimed shooting down an IAF Gnat fighter which he had not!!!! That was one cardinal reason that all of 19 Sqdn missions and claims inside India were described in the words of Indian pilots who were eye witnesses (AM Raghavendran in his memoirs and Boby Dey at Latimer, England) and substantiated by them as well as by some redoubtable Indian historians right up to 2006. No one else has done that and no one can owing to exaggerations on both sides; No:14 Sqdn at Dacca being the only other exception which performed magnificently and also acknowledged by Indian historians. This by no means suggests that pilots from Sargodha and Mauripur did not perform equally superbly. But I am talking about strikes inside enemy territory against airfields.

The Wagha Episod on 6^th September, 1965

Details about the 3 Jat performance, and your comment that some formations were incorrectly named were possibly correct. However, the reader has to be cognizant that my prime aim was focused on Air Ops. And only such ground action in which we interfered and destroyed the enemy invaders. It was completely outside the purview of my story to research the progress of land battle from Indian side or for that matter our own side beyond the effect of our missions; nor did I have space for such indulgence. I think that you have to comment on the scope of my narrative and not what I did not cover. Unless off-course a reviewer feels that it is done to deliberately to obscure some facts with intent to misrepresent an action. Our mission at Wagha is a legend in histories written on both sides, so why not enjoy the success of those young men aged 19-22 who made history. You have done well to describe the 3 Jat ops. and Col. Hyde's valor and becoming an IG police. I was interested in the valor of how our men fought to the last man in some Coys, and saved Lahore.

My research in to air ops of 1965 and 1971 are based on indelibly accurate analyses and no one from either side has contradicted a monosyllable. There is no embellishment, conjecture or attempt to glorify one and malice against the other. These have been substantiated by the top of the line commanders of that war. So I was not treading in the shades of grey at all.

Comments about AM Zafar Choudary tenure as Air Chief

I had been trained by great airmen whose legacy was to create an exceptional pilot out of an insecure raw young man but who had the passion to become the best. I pursued that with fanatical determination, as did our superiors with us. I recall young men who were scared to be posted to my squadron. Once there, they had some difficult times, as recalls ACM Khattak who wrote the foreword for the book. There were many like him who knew that average would not survive with me. But we all started being average or even weak average. It was well known in the PAF that when ever I spotted a young fighter pilot who wore his attitude on his sleeve, roguish and dripping with defiance, I would check on him and get him posted to my unit or wing. I knew that the man had the potential to be harnessed and his energies directed in to professional excellence. These made best fighter pilots when handled with affection, personal professionalism and indeed a whip. Asghar Khan, NUR and Rahim had taught us exactly that. Also, these icons stoutly rejected making moral judgment about personal élan, habits and domestic lives of offices unless it violated the norms of air force discipline. It was these leaders who set out on this mission to give us very high bars to survive and professional excellence to become a habit not a choice. Not all reached that galaxy but I can proudly say that out of about 14 pilots, from 19 squadron Five made air marshals, One Air Chief Marshal and three made two star ranks and one from another unit made the Air Chiefs. Five earned the highest gallantry awards in 1965 and four in 1971. Under my command No.19 Sqdn won all three competitive trophies- For best Flight Safety Record; the best armament Squadron trophy and the best fighter pilot's Sher Afghan sword. In 65 war this Sqdn was unique for ending unscathed, not a single pilot or aircraft lost with maximums numbers flown by any PAF squadron and maximum claims substantiated by the enemy, no less. That is my pride and achievement, not what I did or did not achieve personally, which has been of little consequence to me. But the question I pose to you is that why did I achieve so much during the first three commands of PAF. Simply because we had superb guidance, recognition by merit alone, no moral judgment of our life style or censure for personal likes and dislikes. Thus professionalism flourished and the PAF achieved unbelievable standard all round. With all the successes under my belt, 5 green endorsements by AMs Asghar Khan and Nur Khan and a golden eagle on my chest for having been awarded exceptional pilot grade as the youngest Flt.Lt, by the legend A.Cdre. FS Hussain, AVM Sadruddin and A.Cdr. Bill latif, all exceptional pilots.

The reason for narrating my pluses is that the day ZAB made his fateful decision and changed the PAF command and AVM Zafar Choudary got in the saddle all my pluses became my Achilles heel. From then on it was a vale hunt for sajad Haider and the ilk. I was not alone. Why! I ask you? It seemed that wearing a gallantry and professional excellence awards placed pilots in the cross-hair of the new high command comprising the Chief, AVM Saeedullah Khan and particularly Khaqan Abbasi. The rest is exciting history which is lucidly captured in the Flight of the Falcon. Incidentally, your statement that A.Cdre. Zafar Choudary was the D of Ops in 1965 war is not correct. He was not on the team of AM Nur Khan, who ran the operations with A.Cdre. Rahim Khan. Saeedullah Khan was D of plans but assisting the leadership. AM Asghar Khan in his book 'The First Round' talked about timid officers who were against the initiative of a pre-emptive strike plan and had to be shut up, was a reference to the gentlemen who caused the delay on 6^th morning for launching the pre-emptive were ruling the roost in 1972.

Your strong comment on the fly-past

I always was most respectful to the AM, Zafar Choudary, Saeedullah Khan and even Khaqan Abbasi right from the time I was a young cub. It was in 1972 when I began to find out from several senior officers and ACM Zulfiqar when he was my base commander that the high command wanted my head. Not on any professional ground but sheer malice about my life style. Several of the fighter pilots of my seniority like G.Capt. Sikandar, W.Cdr. MM Alam, and even Zulfiqar Ali Khan were tapped and hounded by spooks and chased like you can not even imagine. The biggest tactical fighter base Sargodha was crackling with tension.

The aftermath of 1971 and the non-operational activities of high command finally created a pressure cooker effect which imploded on the fly-past rehearsal day. I found out from Hakimullah who was leading the Mirage Sqdn. about the reprehensible indiscipline in the air. If you had read my narrative about the sordid episode I have condemned it vociferously. Also, you wondered if any inquiry was done and culprits identified. This is clearly covered in the book. My disgust for the behavior of those responsible was loudly expressed as cowardice. Three officers had owned up later that they made cat calls but not expletives. There were 100 aircraft from several bases and the disaffection was wide spread against the high command. Your comments tend to convey as though no mention was made of the ugly incident in my book. So you stand corrected. What you missed out was the reaction of the Air chief who should have sensed that he did not have his hand on the pulse of his command. What should have been the option of a commander of his intellect? To engage the service in professional pursuits and address the grievances but definitely not to direct the master spook of the PAF to spy on the telephone lines of you know who. He called one the financially and morally most controversial officer Khaqan Abbasi, who had caused him much harm and embarrassment in PIA, to join his team for the big hunt. But more devastating AM Zafar Choudary ordered 80, no less, tape recorders and ordered W.Cdr. Ms Khan ( The commander of 215 ELINT Sqdn) to install these in all fighters without the knowledge of the pilots. A speech analyst was allegedly brought in from England to decipher pilot voices to catch the offenders. Small mercies the Chief was advised by A.Cdre. Zulfiqar who got the wind of it and warned that there would be mutiny in the PAF if the surreptitious project was not halted. (You may confirm this with MS Khan). So then what did you expect to happen? A mutiny there was simmering subterranean.

A conspiracy in which two rabid young officers were truly involved, but the high command used it to prove to a very anxious ZAB who had warned the air chief that he had lost the confidence of his service, that the miscreants of fly-past were the same as hauled up for the conspiracy. Thus nearly 40 officers were hauled up and grilled which damaged their self confidence even as these were released later and 14 were indicted in the conspiracy. I was the joker in the pack who could not be manacled on any legal, professional and moral grounds. But I could be incarcerated for treason at the will of the air chief. After eight months of purgatory hell I was the first and only officer exonerated by the seven judge court of all charges, at the end of the prosecution case built on 1100 pages of evidence, none against me. It was on a plea of no case. The air chief ordered the President of the court (Still living and had told me the sordid story from his view point) to keep me under arrest. The Govt intervened and ordered the chief to release me immediately. Then AM Zafar Choudary who had in my presence (Before my illegal arrest) said that if even one of the incarcerated officers was set free he would resign. He did not do that but ordered my retirement!! Why, you should re-read the book and kindly revise the review if you find justification.

So it had nothing to do with AM Zafar Choudary being a Qadiani as inferred by you. He like many other from that denomination flourished in the PAF and he became the chief. How can you over simplify if you knew the whole story. It was only after he tried to sack all the exonerated officers that famous lawyers like M. Anwar and others took up the Qadiani issue in the Lahore high court. I was compelled to give evidence against the chief which I stoutly rejected.

But for 30 years after the purgatory hell he and his cabal put me through, I never took his name or criticized him. It was after I read Zafar Choudry's book that I was shocked because he had not stated facts in most of the crucial episodes in his career, especially as the chief. I had to clear the facts of history and I did that without acrimony or malice; but narrated just the way things happened. There are scores of officers of very high moral integrity alive and flourishing who have much more to say about their being witch-hunted but they decided to go on with life and did not have the propensity to relive the dark epoch. Indeed, Zafar Choudary was an articulate man, intelligent and a good flier. But their was a blind spot which made him judge people from his type certified moral yardstick he should not have. In the PAF as AM Asghar Khan and Nur Khan and especially Rahim Khan had said to me in person that leadership in the air, in war and peace and conforming to the tradition of discipline in the service were the only yardsticks of an officer's capability and ascent. That was not the measure of excellence by their successors.

My comment about him becoming a car salesman in USA was not to demean him. The visage of a car salesman in the US conjures up images of a slick and slimy reprobate who peddles lemons for used cars. AM Zafar Choudary was a suave decent gentleman, articulate, intelligent and financially pristine honest. To accept Khaqan Abbasi's munificence to get in to that biz was only to get away from the scene till dementia and amnesia had covered the wounds of injustice and incalculable damage to a sterling service..

Your detailed research about the battle by 3 Jat is intrusive but was not part of my narrative. Therefore, it did not deserve any comment.

I hope I have addressed your analysis in full measure.

Best wishes

Sajad Haider

London Wallpaper

Saturday, April 17, 2010

PAKISTANI PILOTS DID MISSIONS AGAINST USSR AND POSSIBLY CHINA ON BEHALF OF US IN 1960S

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