London Wallpaper: DR HAMID HUSSAINS DISCUSSION WITH A RETIRED GENERAL ABOUT NEXT PAKISTAN ARMY CHIEF

DR HAMID HUSSAINS DISCUSSION WITH A RETIRED GENERAL ABOUT NEXT PAKISTAN ARMY CHIEF

Following was part of ongoing dialogue about selection of army chief and extensions with a respected former Pakistan army officer.

May 07, 2010

Dear Sir;

Thanks for the brief summary of the coming change. I think subject needs more detailed analysis. I'm trying to finish my thoughts on the topic. In the meantime few casual observations and my bipolar ramblings on the subject in your main text & in italics. Personally, I'm against the 'extension business'. My opposition to the practice is based on two points; First majority of senior officers competing for a post are equal and one can pick anyone for the assigned post and he can be as good or bad as his comrade. Opinions about individual officers are purely subjective in nature. Second, the practice has extreme corrosive effect on the relationship between senior brass. Overall, the practice may benefit an individual but harmful to the institution. I'm sure all officers who got extensions recently are fine gentlemen but the real question which should be asked is what really was gained by the institution? Probably Ahmad Shuja Pasha's extension made some sense as he spent barely a year as DGISI. However, Kayani was fully aware when he promoted and appointed him to a powerful position fully knowing that Pasha will have barely a year before his retirement. He may have already made his mind about extension when he was promoting Pasha. Sikandar Afzal was sent to UN (a handsome pay & perks package for the officer and nothing more), Masood Aslam (fine man gone through a personal tragedy spent just few extra months with no short or long term impact on operations. The only reason I see in this extension is that Kayani had already made his mind to appoint Yasin Malik as Peshawar Corps commander and gave few months extension to Aslam so that Malik gets his promotion and then come to take over) and Mustafa Khan (even before his promotion to Lt. General rank, Kayani was well aware that Mustafa will barely finish year and a half before he reaches retirement age. In my view, appointing a senior officer as CGS for 18 months and Corps Commander for a year by giving extension does not serve any purpose. Officer needs at least six month to adjust to his new role especially if that role is dramatically different than his previous assignment. I strongly disagreed when Mussharraf did the same thing rotating senior officers like musical chairs some spending even less than a year at a given post. To his credit, he stayed away from extension business and rewarded loyal subordinates in other ways after retiring them on time). It is quite natural that Shahid Iqbal (Karachi Corps Commander) and Zahid Hussain (QMG) who are in the same shoes as Pasha and Mustafa will be upset if they don't get extensions. One simple reason of giving so many extensions in such a short time could be that Kayani was preparing the ground for his own extension by creating an environment suggesting that 'extension' was norm rather than exception in the army.

General Kayani has done to the best of his abilities in some trying times but in my view he should retire in time and let the next chap carry on. In my view, he will have much more respect and dignity if he bids farewell on time. We all know that current operations are not going to end in a year therefore a year extension will not change the big picture. If someone is giving the argument that circumstances are 'extraordinary' then he should be reminded that since independence in 1947, Pakistan is going through 'extraordinary circumstances' and by that standard COAS should never retire and go on for ever. Those who are advocating his extension may genuinely believe that Kayani is better than anybody else and should continue but in my view the motive may be different. We all know that COAS is the biggest idol in the temple and those who are going to benefit personally and professionally from him may be the strongest advocates of his extension. On the other hand, those officers not in good books of Kayani will be willing to volunteer to erect tents and chairs of his farewell party today. In my view, there is fifty percent chance that Kayani will get extension. If he retires on time, then I think a tacit agreement has been reached between GHQ & civilians about Khalid Shamim Wayen as next chief with the caveat that no one has installed a mine on this smooth road.

'Generalship is bad for people…… The most reasonable of men suffuse with pomposity when stars touch their shoulders'. John Keegan

Regards,

Hamid

………………………………………………………………………..

A correspondent raised the issue of the possible change of the Pakarmy chief later this year. You may find of interest my reply:

So far I have casually accepted the general opinion that Kayani would
get an extension. However, thinking about it now, I do not think it is at
all certain; in fact, I would rate the chances of that happening about
50/50, or worse. The main reason is AA Zardari. (Suspicion and mistrust is mutual. I'm sure that Mr. Zardari is convinced that onslaught against him by 'free media' is orchestrated by GHQ. After all, everybody and his cousin is denouncing the marriage of NRO as illegitimate as well as treatment of Chief Justice by Mussharraf but no journalist has dared to ask the role of General Kayani in both these episodes. After all Kayani was not DG of cantonments or Log Area commander but part of the inner circle of Mussharraf and was directly involved in both these episodes. We all know that generals have no respect for Mr. Zardari and army does not invite him to any military function. I may be wrong but my assessment is that Mr. Zardari is completely quarantined by now. GHQ has secured all bases both domestic and international. In my view, if today Mr. Zardari asks that his military secretary should be replaced, GHQ will refuse. It would have served Pakistan better if there was some cooperation between highest decision makers. Each party suspicious of other undermined the other and the result is intrigues of byzantine proportions. Both sides contributed to this environment.) There are two solid grounds why he
is likely to veto it:

Firstly, revenge. He is a very vindictive person; he has had people killed
who have caused him grief. Kayani has done that a few times. (We all know very well Mr. Zardari's standing, however he was elected by due process no matter how flawed and GHQ gave it's own blessing to the whole exercise. All things being equal what is wrong with Zardari choosing the next army chief? After all he is not going to pick a Colonel or Brigadier but one among the top four or five senior Lt. Generals. Is there a question about the credentials of these five senior generals? Is anyone of them is not qualified? If that is the case then the argument should be given about the individual officer and why he should not be selected? Mr. Zardari will only pick the man for the job and that is all. After that the man with the big gun i.e. COAS is his own man. Case in point is General Muhammad Zia ul Haq and General Abdul Waheed Kakar. Kakar sent the President who chose him home while Zia ul Haq sent his own Colonel-in-Chief to gallows.)

Secondly, self-preservation. AAZ knows that the Supreme Court CJ is still
after him, and at some point down the line a final confrontation is likely.
The outcome of this will depend on which way the army chief goes. AAZ can
have no confidence that Kayani will side with him. On the other hand, a new
chief (appointed by him) is much more likely to do so - out of gratitude,
and because he would not be well set enough to risk a serious crisis in the
country. (History does not support this assertion. All said & done, COAS is his own man and will make decision what is best for the country and his own institution. Last segment suggests that in case of brawl between CJ and Mr. Zardari, General Kayani will risk a serious crisis in the country but the new chap will not. I'm not sure about it. GHQ would prefer that supreme court do the dirty work of dry cleaning so that their own hands remain clean. As a general rule, GHQ prefers current type of arrangement where they have veto power on key decisions, deal independently with international players as well as keep direct funding to their institution outside of budgetary allocation and at the same time not being responsible for the decisions. This is called power without responsibility.)

The accepted wisdom is also that the US would prefer to have Kayani stay on.
I'm not so sure about that, either. The primary aim of the US is to have the
Pakistan army go into and clean out North Waziristan, and beyond. Kayani has
been stringing them along, and they have probably realised that he won't do
it, unless it suited Pakistan at some point. They may well be wondering
whether a new chief, not so sure of himself, might not be pushed (with AAZ's
help) into doing it soon. (Former COAS General Mussharraf's partisans can argue quite the opposite. They can argue that Washington let him stew in his own juice because he was not going everywhere. After all during his time, army was only in South Waziristan. Under General Kayani, army is now fully deployed in six out of seven tribal agencies in addition to whole Malakand division. Someone can conclude from this that Kayani gave much more than Mussharraf. Off course these are just different points of view. Major issue is the strategic question of whether swamps should be drained of the alligators or not? If military has made the decision then disagreements about tactical issues can be solved. It is not fashionable in Pakistan to bring the mirror in the room but how long one can avoid facing the facts. I fully understand the frustration of officer corps as well as their patriotic stance. I'm sure you will understand this much better than any other officer because you not only had a front row seat during difficult times of 1971 but also had the chance to walk on to the stage briefly. Current defense budget of Pakistan is about $3.4 billion and more than fifty percent of it is spent on pays and pensions. Currently, Washington is providing about $1 billion directly to Pakistan armed forces outside of any budgetary allocation. This does not include any classified reimbursement. If Washington is directly subsidizing almost one third of the defense budget of Pakistan, then it will be naïve on part of Pakistan to expect that no questions will be asked. Washington will surely not only demand to look at the books but constantly evaluate whether it is getting the 'bang for the bucks'. In my view whether Kayani stays another year or another officer is selected as COAS, we will not see any dramatic shift in policy as fundamentals of defense budget as well as institutional interests will stay the same.)

In the last few days stories have been appearing in the media (in Pakistan
and the US) suggesting that the army is getting ready to take on N
Waziristan. They appear to be inspired, and that could be either by Kayani
(in order to raise US hopes and preclude them from backing a change) or by a
potential successor (to highlight what he has to offer). (The fundamental issue is the decision by GHQ whether they can allow non-state actors from all over the globe to hang out in their backyard. People are not naïve and understand limitations of such operations. They will be willing to give a lot of room of maneuverability to Pakistan once they are convinced that Pakistan has given up the option of using non-state actors for its national security objectives. Even if GHQ has made that decision, they are not being able to convince many Pakistanis as well as international players. I think there is debate going on among officers at different levels and many are convinced that in changed world Pakistan need to redirect its policies. The era of Jihad Incorporated is over and now decent burial arrangements are needed ASAP. At Major General & Lt. General level some are clear about the new threats to Pakistan. At Lt. Colonel level some are of the view that 'we have to clean the neighborhood of the wolves that have become man eaters' and that if we have to do it then better do it today than tomorrow. Surely, there are other officers not able to shake up the paranoid obsession with India drummed into their heads at Kakul, staff college and NDU. They have not been able to incorporate nuclear deterrence factor in their conventional thought process. Among mid-ranking officers, thought process depends whether the officer has gone through the baptism of fire in tribal areas & Swat or not. As more battalions are rotated through the troubled areas we may see coalescing of ideas and some agreement about the way forward among these officers. In my view, the potential minefield is 'overconfidence' bordering on 'arrogance'. This should be curtailed with emphasis on constant improvement of skills as well as a decent dose of humility. Ideas such as 'we have broken the myth of Waziristan' should be checked as it can prove fatal. One fact that should never be forgotten by every officer & soldier is that they are operating in their own country against their own people and this simple fact alone demands lot of introspection. Current generation of soldiers & officers have paid with their blood for the 'sins of their fathers' and it will be a tragedy if they don't capitalize on the gains made solely due to the enormous sacrifices of many.

International dimension of the problem is not only demands from Washington but concerns are global. After all, it was the telephone call from angry Chinese President to General Mussharraf that resulted in final showdown in Lal Masjid. Russian leaders publicly accused that Chechens involved in attack on subway in Russia had links with people hanging out in FATA and Iran playing a tag with India in Afghanistan to prevent emergence of sectarian vampires. Everything aside, after seeing the horrific carnage on their own streets, the real question which should be asked by Pakistanis is whether all this is good for Pakistan? The way forward will depend on answering this question and not what others think.)

Any comments or ideas?

Warm Regards,

Hamid

London Wallpaper

Saturday, May 8, 2010

DR HAMID HUSSAINS DISCUSSION WITH A RETIRED GENERAL ABOUT NEXT PAKISTAN ARMY CHIEF

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