Few months ago, during conversation with a former Pakistan air force officer
in my ignorance I uttered some blanket statements that were not correct.
This prompted me to go back to the library and go through a number of
sources. I learned a lot and for this I'm thankful to the respected
officer. The outcome of this exercise of the last few months was the
following piece which may be of interest to some. This is about a little
known chapter of Cold war. May be there are some lessons for both Pakistan
and United States. As one of my good friend once said, one enjoys the most
old books and old wines.
Regards,
Hamid
Eye in the Sky – United States, Pakistan and Reconnaissance during Cold War
Hamid Hussain
'Being a friend of the United States is like living on the banks of a great
river. The soil is wonderfully fertile, but every four or eight years the
river changes course, and you may find yourself alone in a desert'.
Pakistan's army chief and President General Muhammad Zia ul Haq to CIA
director William Casey, 1983 (1)
United States and Soviet Union were engaged in a worldwide competition for
dominance after the Second World War. Intelligence gathering was an
important part of this power struggle between the two super powers. In the
pre-satellite era, high altitude reconnaissance by special aircraft and
signal interception were key components of intelligence gathering. In 1950s
and 60s, these operations were conducted from United States as well as from
bases all around the globe.
A variety of equipment was used to gather intelligence including static
electronic monitoring facilities on the borders of Soviet Union, high
altitude reconnaissance aircraft such as U-2 and RB-57 to collect electronic
(ELINT), signals (SIGINT), photos (PHOTOINT), telemetry (TELEINT) and air
sampling for detection of radiation emanating from nuclear test sites.
Several agencies including Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Strategic Air
Command (SAC) of United States Air Force (USAF), United States Air Force
Security Service (USAFSS), United States Army Special Security (USASS) and
National Security Agency (NSA) were involved in these wide ranging
intelligence activities.
Main focus of these operations was monitoring of missile and nuclear test
sites, location of bombers, missile sites and radars and eavesdropping on
Soviet communication system. The general agreement between United States
and Pakistan was that in return for Pakistan's cooperation in such
activities, United States would modernize Pakistani armed forces. Pakistani
part of the deal included provision of facilities for U.S. intelligence
gathering operations as well as cooperation in some aspects of the
operation. Both parties entered into these agreements looking at their own
interests. United States saw Pakistan as a window through which to peep
into Soviet Union's backyard and Pakistan saw this cooperation as a shortest
possible way of modernizing its armed forces.
U-2
'The U-2 was a flaming javelin unwittingly thrown into the dry forest of
suspicions and misperceptions that surrounded American-Soviet relations in
May 1960'. (2)
U-2 was a specially designed aircraft for high altitude flights for
reconnaissance. It had electronic surveillance equipment for monitoring and
recording radar and radio frequencies and a specialized camera for high
resolution photographs. These flights monitored radars, air defenses,
rocket launches and military and industrial sites. (3) It was a joint
operation run by CIA and USAF. CIA paid for the development of the aircraft
and Strategic Air Command (SAC) trained the pilots. (4) Most missions were
flown along Soviet borders and over international waters and not over Soviet
air space. Missions from Wiesbaden base in Germany covered northern and
western parts of the Soviet territory while flights from Turkey covered
southern parts. (5) U-2 flights also operated from Alaska, Japan and
Australia.
President Dwight Eisenhower was fully aware of the potential impact on
relations with Soviet Union as far as over flight missions were concerned;
therefore he kept a tight control on U-2 operations. He was told by CIA
that planes were undetectable by Soviet radar system which proved to be
wrong. In 1956, first two U-2 planes were transported to United Kingdom
(UK) but UK pulled out of the project at the last minute and planes were
shipped backed to Germany. (6) In July 1956, first four U-2 missions over
Soviet air space were flown from Wiesbaden base in Germany in ten days
period. Soviet radars detected the intrusion but could not identify the
plane nor could intercept it. (7) Soviets sent a strong protest note to
Washington with specific dates and times of intrusions forcing Eisenhower to
order termination of additional flights. Information from these early
flights was so valuable that United States could not resist and second
mission was conducted in November 1956 from Incirlik base in Turkey.
Later, U-2 flights were flown from Alaska, California, Texas, Germany,
Turkey, Japan, England, Australia, Brazil, Norway and Pakistan. (8) Most of
these flights were flown along Soviet borders and were not over flights.
Deep penetration flights were personally approved by the President. In four
years, only 24 such deep penetration flights were approved by the President.
(9) Most over flights originated from Turkey as it covered large area of
Soviet Union including Kapustin Yar testing site, bomber fields and military
and industrial targets in Caucus, Ukraine and major cities along Volga.
(10)
Pilots chosen for U-2 were reserve officers with exceptional ratings, top
secret clearance and extra hours on single engine, single place aircraft.
(11) Pilots resigned from the air force and worked under an eighteen month
contract for CIA with much higher pay and no loss of service time in USAF
when they returned back after completing the contract. (12) In the early
stages, it was decided to use non-U.S. citizens for U-2 flights over Soviet
territory. The argument made by Eisenhower was that if a U.S. pilot or a
member of U.S. armed forces was shot down over Soviet territory, in strict
legal sense it could be considered an act of war. Some non-U.S. citizens
were trained; however the idea was dropped for two reasons. First, the
operation could not be kept highly classified in view of a large number of
foreign pilots on the roll and secondly most of the pilots could not sustain
very stringent criteria of training for missions at such heights. Four
Greek pilots were brought for training in 1956 but none of them completed
the training (they were later known as 'Greek Washout). In view of keeping
the secret, CIA kept them in United States sending them to colleges at
government expense. (13) Later, Royal Air Force (RAF) pilots were also
brought into the mission. In case of Pakistan, when U-2 planes started to
operate from Pakistan, no Pakistani air force personnel were involved with
the project with the exception of liaison, logistics and administrative
assistance in running the operations. (14) In 1956, when Washington
approached Pakistan for U-2 flights from Pakistan, Pakistani government
hesitated and complained about the slow current rate of military assistance.
Since 1954, relations between two countries have been strained due to
disagreements on defense assistance issue and lengthy delays due to
bureaucratic wrangling in Washington. On January 10, 1957, National
Security Council approved enhanced program of military assistance to
Pakistan (NSC 5701). The estimated cost of this enhanced program was $410
million for military assistance and $374.7 million for defense support for
the three year period of 1957-1960. (15) U.S. committed to raise and
support four infantry and one and a half armored division of Pakistan army,
absorption of additional 40'000 soldiers in Pakistan army as well as
equipment for air force and navy.
In January 1957, Eisenhower approved a three year increase in military aid
and next month a restricted area of Peshawar base saw construction to
welcome U-2. Richard Bissell was in charge of U-2 program at CIA. His
assistant, James Cunningham negotiated with Pakistan army chief General
Muhammad Ayub Khan. (16) Peshawar and Lahore were two sites from where U-2
was flown over Soviet territory. A Pakistan Air Force liaison officer was
assigned to U-2 program operating from Pakistan. (17) There was no
permanent stationing of U-2 planes on Pakistani soil. Detachment 10-10
based at Incirlik base near Adana in Turkey flew missions from Pakistan.
Usually, for security reasons, pilot and some essential crew members were
flown a night before in a C-130 plane from Turkey. U-2 flown by standby
pilot would bring in the plane so that there was least amount of exposure.
(18) Main target of flights originating from Pakistan was Tyurtam missile
testing site and cosmodrome in Kazakhstan as well as military installations
along Trans-Siberian railways and down range radar array that was a terminal
site for missile firings from Kapustin Yar. (19) The first U-2 flight from
Pakistan flew over Soviet Union and landed at a small desert airstrip near
Mashhad from where it went back to Turkey. (20) There were total of twenty
four U-2 over flights over Soviet Union from 1956 to 1960. Out of twenty
four, ten were launched from Pakistan. First five flights originated from
Lahore and the remaining five from Peshawar. The first Soviet over flight
from Pakistan took off from Lahore on August 05, 1957. (21)
In early 1960, CIA Director Allen Dulles and Bissell were worried about a
new ballistic missile launch site in northern Urals and wanted to send some
U-2 flights to check this out. Eisenhower was reluctant to authorize the
flights in view of upcoming summit in Paris in June 1960. He finally agreed
and on April 09, 1960, a U-2 took off from Peshawar for a Soviet over
flight. The plane flew over Tayurtam launching site, nuclear testing site
of Semipalatinsk and air defense missile site near Saryshagan. Soviet
leader Nikita Khrushchev was in Crimea and when informed about the U-2
flight was furious and threatened that if the next intruder was not shot
down, he would severely punish several generals. (22) Soviet leadership
appointed a commission after this incident to investigate why Soviet air
defense systems were not able to target these aircrafts. Colonel Alexander
Orlov then serving on the staff of Air Defense Forces was member of this
commission. According to Orlov, many shortcomings were discovered and
rectified. (23) In Washington, Dulles and Bissell asked for another mission
as photos of suspected long range missile site near Plesetsk were not good.
(24) Soviet defense had also progressed during these years. In early 1960,
Soviets had inducted P-30 radar system that could detect aircraft at high
altitudes, SU-9 Fish pot high altitude interceptor aircraft and S-75 and
SA-2 Guideline missile system capable of reaching a target at approximately
80'000 feet. (25)
The Francis Gary Powers fame U-2 flight that was shot down over Soviet Union
on May 01, 1960 originated from Peshawar. Powers arrived by a C-130 plane
along with some ground crew members in Peshawar on April 27. U-2 was flown
by stand by pilot from Incirlik base in Turkey, however it had to return on
April 27 and 28 due to inclement weather over Soviet Union. (26) Planned
mission was a long flight over Soviet Union covering a distance of about
3800 miles and landing at Bodo, Norway. Flight path after take off from
Peshawar was to fly over Afghanistan then over Dushanbe proceeding to
Tayurtam cosmodrome. From there plane was to fly over Chelyabinsk and then
over the industrial hub of Sverdlovsk. Soviet main atomic research site was
located near Sverdlovsk. The plane was to go over Kirov then to Plesetsk
which was a base for the new SS-6 intercontinental ballistic missiles. (27)
U-2 was to fly over Archangel then White Sea and finally making a turn
around Barents Sea and land at Bodo in Norway. Soviet radar system was
tracking the plane the moment it entered Soviet air space. According to
Khrushchev, he got a phone call from Minister of Defense Marshal Malinovsky
at five o'clock in the morning when U-2 entered Soviet airspace from
Afghanistan. (28) A Soviet SU-9 Fish pot high altitude interceptor took off
from Sverdlovsk air field and was able to reach the desirable altitude but
didn't see the target. (29) Soviet Air Defence commander Marshal Sergei
Biryuzov along with deputy chief of operations for Air Defense Command
Colonel Georgi Mikhailov from their command center informed Khrushchev that
'there is no rocket site ready until it gets to Sverdlovsk. At Sverdlovsk,
we can try our luck'. This U-2 was shot down near Sverdlovsk when a SA-2
(Soviet name for this was C-75) surface to air missile burst near its tail.
(30)
Washington had a general agreement with all host governments including
Pakistan that in case of an incident United States would declare that it was
flying U-2 without the permission of host government. Hugh Cumming was head
of State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and was chief
liaison with CIA. When news of U-2 crash in Soviet Union was confirmed, a
prepared cover story written several years ago was discussed at the meeting.
This story stated that a NASA U-2 weather plane flying from Turkey had
accidentally over flown Pakistan without permission after the pilot reported
mechanical problems by radio. There was debate about mentioning of
Pakistan. Cumming insisted that Pakistan's name should be deleted from the
cover story. The problem was that by removing the Pakistan name, they had
to come up with a new cover flight plan. Technicians using their tools drew
a new triangular flight plan for the new cover story. (31) The reason for
removing Pakistan's name from the story was the impression in Washington
that Pakistan might not be able to take the heat from the Soviet Union
compared to Turkey.
President Ayub Khan was in London when London CIA station chief gave him the
news of downing of U-2. Pakistan's former Foreign Secretary Mohammad
Ikramullah who was accompanying Ayub issued the statement that his country
had no information that the U-2 had stopped off in Peshawar. (32) Ayub Khan
told reporters that 'The Americans are our friends. These planes come and
visit our country. How do we know where they go after they leave our
country?' (33) On May 07, 1960, Khrushchev addressed the meeting of the
Supreme Soviet. Angry Khrushchev thundered, "from the lofty rostrum of the
Supreme Soviet, we warn those countries that make their territory available
for launching planes with anti-Soviet intentions: Do not play with fire,
gentlemen! The governments of Turkey, Pakistan and Norway must be clearly
aware that they are accomplices in this flight … If these governments did
not know – and I allow in this case they were not informed – they should
have known what the American military was doing in their territory against
the Soviet Union". (34) Two days later, Khrushchev confronted Pakistani
ambassador Salman Ali at Czechoslovakia embassy reception and warned that
'Peshawar had been marked on a map and pinpointed by Soviet rockets'. (35)
On May 13, Soviet foreign minister formally summoned Pakistani envoy along
with his counterparts from Turkey and Norway and 'threatened military attack
in revenge for their complicity in the U-2 flights'. (36)
In 1967, Ayub Khan in his memoirs noted that 'in the U-2 incident we were
clearly at fault, but the whole thing had been as much of a shock to us as
it was to the Soviet Union'. (37) This statement is only half true as Ayub
Khan was fully aware of the nature of the project from the beginning and
what he admitted in 1967 was well in line with the secret agreement between
Pakistan and United States that in case of downing in hostile territory,
United States will state that they have been flying U-2 without Pakistan
government's knowledge. No further over flights over Soviet Union were
carried out by U-2 after the May 01, 1960 incident. In reference to the
downing of U-2, Ayub Khan in his diary wrote 'Gary Cooper' confusing Francis
Gary Powers name with then famous Hollywood actor Gary Cooper. (38) Another
interesting fact is that Francis Gary Powers mission was codenamed
'Operation Grand Slam'. In 1965, Pakistan also gave the codename 'Operation
Grand Slam' to its offensive in Kashmir. Both missions didn't live up to
their illustrious titles.
No
Date
Origin
Pilot
Target
1
August 05, 1957
Lahore
Eugene 'Buster' Edens
Tyurtam missile facility
2
August 12, 1957
Lahore
Not Known
Not Known
3
August 21, 1957
Lahore
Not Known
Semipalatinsk nuclear facility
4
August 22, 1957
Lahore
Jim Cherbonneaux
Semipalatinsk nuclear facility
5
August 28, 1957
Lahore
E K Jones
Tyurtam missile facility
6*
July 09, 1959
Peshawar
Marty Knutson
Saryshagan & Semipalatinsk
7
December 06, 1959
Peshawar
Robbie Robinson
Tyurtam & Kapustin Yar
8
February 05, 1960
Peshawar
John MacArther
Bomber site at Kazan
9*
April 09, 1960
Peshawar
Bob Ericson
Saryshagan, Semipalatinsk
& Tyurtam
10
May 01, 1960
Peshawar
Francis Gary Powers
Tyurtam & Chelyabinsk
TABLE: 1 U-2 Over flights from Pakistan. * Flights No 6 and 9 originating
from Peshawar landed at Zahedan in Iran. The longest U-2 over flight
covering 4'200 miles originating from Cubi point base in Philippines landed
at Dhaka on May 15, 1959. (39)
RB-57
'Though I fly through the valley of death , I shall fear no evil, for I am
at 50,000 feet and climbing.'
RB-57 was a modified version of B-57 for reconnaissance. In 1959, Pakistan
received B-57 bombers from United States. These planes were from 345th
Tactical Bomber Wing of USAF based at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia.
This wing was deactivated in June 1959 and bombers given to Pakistan. (40)
After shooting down of U-2 over Soviet Union in 1960, U-2 over flights were
discontinued. Various models of RB-57 were developed for high altitude
reconnaissance. RB-57B had a ceiling of 65'000 feet and RB-57 F had a
ceiling of 80'0000 feet. United States provided two RB-57 B models to
Pakistan in early 1960s. These planes were optimized for PHOTOINT and ELINT.
In 1965, two state of the art RB-57 Fs (nick named droopy due to their
enormous wing span of 200 feet) were also provided to Pakistan. The droopy
was exclusively an electronic intelligence gathering and photo
reconnaissance platform that could cruise at altitudes up to 80,000 feet
above sea level and thus stay well beyond the then air defense capability if
flying at maximum heights. RB-57F was used for PHOTOINT through a special
high altitude cameras as well as equipment for ELINT and SIGINT. In view of
curtailment of over flights over hostile territories in the aftermath of the
May 1960 shooting down of U-2 over Soviet Union, new equipment was
developed. State of the art side looking camera installed on RB-57 could
take detailed pictures from nearly sixty miles away allowing the planes to
fly over international waters as well as inside the host country airspace.
Four RB-57s were part of then classified No 24 Intelligence Squadron of PAF
based in Peshawar. (41) Two were RB-57 Fs for high altitude reconnaissance
and two were RB-57 Bs used for electronic intelligence gathering (ELINT) and
signal interception. These planes were provided to Pakistan with an
understanding that they will be used for surveillance against Soviet Union
and possibly China. Two British Royal Air Force pilots trained in Texas
were associated with some of the RB-57 missions originating from Pakistan.
PAF pilots took over RB-57 missions and the names of at least two pilots are
known; Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal and Squadron Leader Rashid Mir.
This author has not been able to confirm that PAF pilots were involved in
over flight missions over Soviet Union. PAF pilots flew RB-57s over
Pakistan's northern areas which border Afghanistan where a narrow strip of
Wakhan separates Pakistan from Soviet Union. Pakistan's northern areas also
share border with China. ELINT, SIGINT and TELINT equipment was probably
used to obtain information from the bordering areas of Soviet Union and
China without directly flying over the territory. U.S. technical staff
installed the surveillance equipment prior to the flight and removed it
after the mission (42) Initially, Pakistani crew was not briefed about the
missions and simply given the route of their flight. One navigator
protested and demanded that they be briefed about the missions and after
this protest Pakistani pilots were briefed about the missions. (43)
Commander of 215 Intel Analysis Squadron, a Wing Commander rank Pakistan Air
Force officer coordinated with Americans. American technicians after
deciphering all information from the equipments installed in the RB-57s
would share some information with Pakistani liaison officers. Most likely
this information was related to India. (44)
It is very difficult to confirm whether Pakistani pilots flew over flight
missions over Soviet territory as two known pilots associated with RB-57s
are not alive. If Pakistan was involved in over flight missions, that would
tantamount to 'recklessness' on part of Pakistan's higher decision makers.
Pakistan took enormous risk as this act would be considered direct
provocation of then super power Soviet Union. The enormity of the risk is
highlighted by the fact that after the 1960 shoot down of U-2, Soviet Union
had clearly warned Pakistan of dire consequences in case of use of Pakistani
territory for such operations.
In 1965 when tensions increased between Pakistan and India, United States
wanted to move some of its 'expensive toys' out of the hot zone. Pakistan
resisted these measures to use these state of the art planes against India.
One RB-57 F returned to United States prior to the start of all out war in
September 1965. Second RB-57 F was damaged by Indian air defense during a
mission on September 15, 1965 but Squadron Leader Rashid Mir landed the
damaged plane safely at Peshawar. It was repaired and later returned to
United States. One RB-57 B flown by Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal was shot
down by friendly fire during the war. The lone remaining RB-57 B (tail
number 3934) was destroyed during an Indian Air Force air raid on December
05, 1971 at Mauripur base thus ending the RB-57 chapter of Pakistan air
force. (45) Details of RB-57 operations in Pakistan are still classified in
United States. In Pakistan not many people are alive who were intimately
involved with the project and an odd one or two with some detailed knowledge
are not willing to talk about it. This makes any detailed and meaningful
analysis very difficult.
Badaber Base
'In God we trust, all others we monitor'. Intercept Operator's motto. NSA
Study, Deadly Transmissions, December 1970 (46)
In 1950s, United States ringed Soviet Union with several listening posts.
Ground stations listening to Soviet communications were set up at Samsun and
Trabzon in Turkey, Germany, Scotland, Philippines, Crete, Taiwan and Japan.
(47) These operations were run by NSA and intelligence arm of United States
Air Force then designated United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS).
NSA also provided equipment to be installed in U-2 planes that recorded
emissions from Soviet radar, microwave and ground communications. (48)
Soviet radar installations communicated with each other through high
frequency circuits. These high frequency signals bounce between earth and
ionosphere, therefore right equipment can pick these signals thousands of
miles away. (49)
In 1958, United States and Pakistani governments started negotiations to set
up an American listening post in West Pakistan. In 1959, a ten year lease
was signed between Pakistan and United States. United States Air Force
Security Service (USAFSS) chose a site near the village of Badaber on the
outskirts of Peshawar and the 'Project Sandbag' was started. The unit
assigned was designated 6937 Communications Group also known as Peshawar Air
Station (PAS). (50) The first commander of the unit responsible for setting
up the infrastructure was Colonel Ethyl Branham. Badaber base was an
electronic surveillance facility primarily run by NSA. No aircraft were
involved in this operation. It monitored Soviet air defense systems and
tracked the path of the surveillance flights but aircraft were not flown
from this facility. They monitored Soviet reaction to reconnaissance
flights but were not directly involved with the operations of these flights.
The primary mission of Badaber facility was monitoring events at the Tyurtam
missile test center and its downrange tracking stations. The facility had
remote transmitter and receiver sites for high frequency teletype
communications with the US military communications network. (51)
There were Pakistani liaison officers attached to the facility for
coordination but they were not allowed in operational areas. When Francis
Gary Powers U-2 was shot down, at an unclassified Commanders Call, the
Americans stationed at the base were told that the 6937th had no knowledge
of the U-2 mission. (52) No Pakistani officer directly participated in any
capacity in these operations; however a Wing Commander rank Pakistan Air
Force officer coordinated with Americans. Only a handful of high ranking
Pakistani military officials including C-in-C of the army and air force
chief were taken into confidence. No Pakistani civilians were allowed in
the facility. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who was then serving as acting foreign
minister on his visit to Peshawar requested to visit the Badaber base.
Peshawar deputy commissioner Roedad Khan conveyed this request to American
base commander Colonel Thomas C. Hyde. The reply came that Bhutto 'would be
welcome to visit the cafeteria where he would be entertained and served
coffee and sandwiches' and that he would be allowed to visit only the
cafeteria and no other part of the base. (53)
Sometimes Pakistani officials exaggerated their contribution to the alliance
with United States to extract more concessions especially military hardware.
In the fall of 1963, Ayub jotted down talking points in his diary in
preparation for his meeting with Secretary of State George Ball. In
reference to American facilities on Pakistani soil, he wrote, 'the facility
provided to the Americans to establish a major satellite and rocket
launching center in Badaber which exposed Pakistan to the wrath of the
Russians'. (54) It is not clear whether Ayub wanted to exaggerate Pakistan
contribution as a bargaining tool or was not fully aware of the nature of
the project at Badaber. Badaber base was only an electronic listening post
and had nothing to do with any satellite reconnaissance and definitely not a
rocket launching center. There were no U.S. rockets or missiles based on
Pakistani soil. It is not known whether Ayub shared this thought with Ball
and if he did it would have left a poor impression of Ayub. However,
knowing very well that his bargaining position was strong, Ayub argued that
by allowing U.S. facilities to operate, Pakistan was increasing its own
exposure to Soviet retaliation. During Eisenhower's visit to Pakistan in
December 1959, this was the main argument used by Ayub to get a squadron of
F-104s with Sidewinder missile. (55) In 1964, CIA's own analysis concluded
that 'The Pakistani President knows that the strongest card he holds is the
US communications facilities at Peshawar'. He almost certainly calculates
that closing the facilities would bring a drastic reduction in the US
military and economic assistance on which Pakistan is so heavily dependent
and for which there is no alternative in sight'. (56)
In early 1960s, United States and Pakistan started to drift apart from their
alliance in view of increased American support to India in the aftermath of
Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. Pakistan got alarmed at these developments
and started to repair its relations with Soviet Union. Ayub Khan visited
Soviet Union in 1965 and gave Soviet leaders indication that when ten year
lease of Badaber base ended in 1969, he would not renew it. He also
suggested a quid pro quo between issues of U.S. bases in Pakistan and Soviet
Union's veto on Kashmir resolutions and suggested that 'the matter could be
negotiated and the two sides could come to a reasonable arrangement'. (57)
Washington got alarmed and angry by Ayub's visit to China and Soviet Union
and while Ayub was still in Soviet Union Washington announced that Ayub's
upcoming visit to United States in April 1965 was rescheduled due to
President Johnson's busy schedule. Pakistan approached Soviet Union for
arms but Soviet leaders were lukewarm to the idea. Ayub was thinking about
using increased ties with Soviets as a bargaining chip and wrote in his
diary on September 26, 1966, 'It is in our interest that our relations with
the Soviets should gain depth. We can then develop greater leverage with
the United States and India'. (58)
Ayub visited Soviet Union again in September 1967 and gave firm commitment
to Soviet leaders about his decision not to renew the Badaber lease next
year. In 1968 Pakistan informed Washington of its decision about closure of
Badaber base at the termination of the lease that pleased Soviets. American
ambassador sought an urgent interview with Ayub and conveyed 'the great
disappointment of his government. (59) On April 06, 1968 Pakistan gave
notice to United States government that Pakistan will not be renewing the
lease and on April 17 Soviet Prime Minister Aleksi Kosygin arrived in
Pakistan for wide ranging talks. Soviets agreed to help Pakistan in various
projects including atomic power plant, steel mill and radio link between
Soviet Union and Pakistan. (60) In 1969, U.S. winded up its operations from
Badaber base and officially the operations ended on January 07, 1970 when
base was handed over to PAF.
China Factor
'We may lose Pakistan, unless we can convince Ayub that he can't have his
cake and eat it too'. National Security Council aide Robert Komer's advice
to President Lyndon B. Johnson regarding Pakistan's expanding relations with
China, April 22, 1965 (61)
Soviet Union and China were closed societies and it was very hard for
American or any other Western intelligence agency to run covert programs on
the ground. Both countries were shut off to the outside world and Soviet
Union earned the nickname of 'Iron Curtain' while China was called 'Bamboo
Curtain'. In 1950s and 60s, United States was supporting Tibetan guerrillas
fighting against Chinese control. United States worked with both India and
Pakistan to run these covert operations in Tibet (Operation St. Circus).
Main operating hub of these operations was from India. Pakistan provided
transit facilities to American aircraft and personnel in East Pakistan in
support of the rebellion in Tibet. (62) Pakistan concluded a border
agreement with China in 1963 and pulled out of the covert operations
supporting Tibetans.
U.S. approach towards over flights over mainland China was radically
different than its operations against Soviet Union. Foreign pilots were
associated with some U-2 surveillance programs such as Operation Diamond Li
and several nationalist Chinese pilots were trained and they flew missions
over mainland China. Taoyuan base near Taipei was jointly run by 35th
Black Cat Squadron of nationalist Chinese pilots and U.S. personnel of
Detachment H. In the fall of 1959 first batch of five nationalist Chinese
pilots was trained, however first over flight mission over China was carried
out in January 1962. (63) Over flights over China continued up to 1974 and
during these years many U-2 were shot down by Chinese air defense forces.
U.S. high altitude reconnaissance of Chinese military and nuclear targets
was coordinated mainly from Taiwan. Local CIA station Chief Ray Cline
coordinated with U-2 operations conducted from Taiwan. From 1961 to 1964,
at least four U-2s were shot down over mainland China. (64) Main Chinese
targets were missile range in Kansu province and nuclear test site at Lop
Nur. Neither Pakistan nor United States have acknowledged that any
surveillance activity against China was conducted from Pakistan. A former
Director General of Inter Services Intelligence (DG ISI) Lieutenant General
Javed Nasir disclosed in 1998 that in 1960s CIA painted Pakistan
International Airlines (PIA) planes with special chemicals to detect
radiation from Chinese nuclear test sites. (65) PIA was one of the few
commercial airlines flying regularly to China at that time. No American or
Western airline was flying commercial flights to China.
In 1957, United States had started High Altitude Air Sampling Program (HASP)
by flying planes over its own nuclear test sites to improve the system of
analyzing air samples for nuclear activity (other modalities such as
acoustic, seismic and static radiological monitoring systems such as ground
filter units were also used). (66) RB-57s based in Pakistan were probably
part of Operation Little Cloud which conducted missions of downward air
sampling of nuclear debris as Chinese nuclear test site was at Lop Nur in
Xinjiang province which is close to Pakistani border and in 1963-64 Chinese
were conducting tests at this site. These operations were likely over
Pakistani territory and not over flights over Chinese airspace. If this
assertion is true, the time frame is probably 1962-64 when U.S.-Pakistan
relations were still robust while relations between Pakistan and China were
not yet very strong. By mid 1960s, relationships between Pakistan and China
have taken a strategic dimension and Pakistan probably stopped cooperation
as far China was concerned.
It is not likely that Pakistan would have risked this crucial relationship
especially in view of estrangement from U.S. in the context of increased
U.S. support to India after Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. This conclusion
is based on the fact that on November 10, 1964, U.S. ambassador Walter
McConaughy , Chief of CIA directorate of Plans for South Asia James
Critchfield and Karachi CIA station chief John Shaffer met with President
Ayub Khan in Karachi. China had conducted its nuclear test few weeks
earlier. Critchfield asked for a 'standing permission' to conduct air
sampling missions over Pakistan territory against China but Ayub refused
stating that 'we can not afford to make anymore enemies'. (67) From
Pakistani side, Director General of Inter Services Intelligence (DGISI)
Brigadier Riaz Hussain and Director General of Foreign Office Salman Ali
were also present at this meeting. Who could know the perils of such
adventures better than Salman Ali? Ali was Pakistan's envoy to Moscow in
1960 when Khrushchev pulled him aside at a diplomatic reception and
threatened Pakistan with dire consequences in the aftermath of shooting down
of Francis Gary Powers U-2.
Pakistan pursued its own national interest of building solid relations with
China. In early 1965, Ayub Khan was given a warm welcome in China and Prime
Minister Zhou Enlai conducted him to different cities. President Johnson
expressed his displeasure by sending a note to Pakistan's ambassador to
Washington that 'I don't relish the sight of my friend Ayub breaking bread
with my enemies'. (68) Johnson had earlier abruptly cancelled Ayub's
upcoming visit to Washington in April 1965 on the issue of Ayub's visit to
China. Ayub met President Johnson in Washington in December 1965 and
Johnson bluntly told Ayub that future Pakistan-U.S. relations will depend to
a great extent on Pakistan's willingness to curtail its ties with China.
Later, Johnson sent a letter to Ayub stating that 'the old slate had been
wiped clean in South Asia'. (69)
Pakistan disappointed by its relations with United States expanded its
relations with China and pursued its own interests. By mid 1960s, Pakistan
and United States were drifting apart mainly on the issue of China. U.S.
with its involvement in Vietnam saw China as a serious immediate threat and
Washington's ambassador to Pakistan Walter P. McConaughy was the leading
expert on Chinese affairs. He had served as director of China affairs at
State Department, served as ambassador to Burma and Korea and briefly served
as assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs prior to his
appointment to Pakistan. (70) India-Pakistan war of 1965 finally put a stop
to a decade long defense relations between United States and Pakistan.
Pakistan gradually drifted away from American sphere of influence and moved
more closely towards China in its quest for security against India.
Pakistan tried to use its relations with Russia and China as a bargaining
chip and in November 1966, Ayub in his meeting U.S. ambassador Eugene Murphy
Locke told him that Pakistan will get some weapons from China and if U.S.
didn't provide the military aid, Pakistan will approach Soviet Union for
weapons. (71) Pakistan was not successful in its efforts and relations
between Pakistan and United States remained low key as both parties were
disappointed.
Handshake in the Shadows
'The trouble is that the Americans are trying too hard to save their money.
The fools don't realize that our strength one day will be of immense value
to them'. Pakistani C-in-C General Muhammad Ayub Khan, July 1958 (72)
'Pak policies have now succeeded in alienating two Presidents; if the Paks
aren't careful, they may kill the goose that lays the golden egg'. Robert
W. Komer, South Asia aide to National Security Council, July 24, 1964 (73)
The opinions are quite divergent about the contribution of intelligence
operations conducted form Pakistani soil. Most Pakistanis consider them
highly valuable to U.S. national security while Americans downplay its
significance in the global context. High altitude reconnaissance operating
from Turkey and Pakistan provided crucial information about Soviet military
and nuclear facilities. Vital information about Soviet military
capabilities uncovered by these flights resulted in refutation of 'bomber
gap' and 'missile gap'. In addition, Soviet nuclear test sites at Novaya
Zemlya and Semipalatinsk, weapons plant near Alma Ata and defensive missile
site at Saryshagan were discovered by U-2 flights. (74) Tayurtam launch
site was accidentally discovered when a U-2 pilot flying over Soviet
Turkistan deviated from his designated course to look at an interesting
site. Later, photo interpreters built the whole model of Tayurtam site.
(75) U-2 flights not only obtained photographs but also carried intercept
equipment capturing signals of Soviet radar systems. (76) This provided a
layout of Soviet air defense systems to U.S. military planners. Table 2
gives the details of Soviet sites monitored through intelligence operations
run from Pakistan. (77) Eisenhower's dilemma was that he could not share
secret information provided by U-2 over flights with Congress. However,
armed with the information provided by U-2 'enabled him to withstand
formidable pressure from the military-industrial complex and its supporters
on the Hill for massive increases in arms expenditure'. (78)
Pakistan was worried about the potential risks it was taking by allowing
U.S. intelligence gathering missions from its soil. In CIA's Deputy
Director of Intelligence Robert Amory's words 'The Pakistanis were always
worrywarts'. (79) Field Marshal Ayub Khan was directly involved in
negotiations and he rightly felt that he had got a good deal for Pakistan
and its armed forces by hard bargaining with Washington in return for
cooperation with U.S. on intelligence against Soviet Union. Ayub stressed
this point in his meeting with Secretary of State George Ball in September
1963 stating that, 'You have been good friends and helped us in many ways,
but we too have been very good friends and in doing so incurred lots of
risks and odium'. (80) One thing that Ayub could not comprehend at that
time was that Washington clearly knew that high altitude reconnaissance
flights as well as ground installations were only a transient stage as with
satellite technology (which Washington was pursuing with full speed) the
whole ball game will change. Washington was clearly expecting that U-2
flights will end in the next few years. On part of Ayub, 'if permission to
fly the U-2 from Pakistan was part of the quid pro quo, then his power to
demand renewed aid would be diminished'. (81)
Fathers of U-2 were very clear from the beginning about the narrow window of
opportunity before Soviets caught up with their efforts. Allen Dulles and
Richard Bissell told Eisenhower that 'with advances in Soviet fighter planes
and ground-to-air missiles, the U-2 would probably be able to fly safely
over Russia for only two to three years'. (82) Eisenhower was also clear in
his mind and had told the CIA that 'U-2 flights should be held to a minimum
pending the viability of this new equipment'. (83) This 'new equipment' was
satellite technology. It was calculated that once United States had
acquired satellite reconnaissance capability, then the strategic value of
overseas bases would be diminished. Thus Pakistan's cooperation was crucial
for only three to four years. (84) During all these parleys, Soviet Union
was not sitting idly and was trying to keep itself informed of Pakistan's
foreign policy by recruiting agents in Pakistan's foreign ministry and
diplomatic corps. (85)
Soviet Union fully aware of the U.S. intelligence operations conducted from
Pakistan was not sitting passively. It was working overtime to get as much
information as possible. Soviet Union was able to get some crucial
information by recruiting some highly placed agents in Pakistan. Some of
these high profile agents included senior officers of ministry of foreign
affairs including an ambassador (this helped Soviet to decipher large part
of Pakistan's diplomatic correspondence) and an officer at military's
communication center at Rawalpindi. (86)
In the aftermath of 1965 war, when United States stopped all parts and
supplies to Pakistan, Pakistani leadership was enraged. Soviet Union's
secret service KGB chipped in to widen the gulf between Pakistan and United
States. It passed forged documents to Pakistan government which showed that
U.S. ambassador Walter McConaughy was plotting to overthrow Ayub Khan
(Operation REBUS). In July 1966, Operation SPIDER was another attempt by
KGB to convince Ayub Khan that United States was using West German press
agency Tarantel to discredit him due to his close relations with China.
(87)
Several factors contributed towards Pakistan's drift from close relations
with United States in 1960s. Poor handling of the crisis in the aftermath
of shooting down of U-2 over Soviet Union created serious doubts in
Pakistan's mind about American competence to handle a crisis. Economic
assistance to India and in the aftermath of Sino-Indian war of 1962
increased military assistance alarmed Pakistan. The final blow to
U.S.-Pakistan relations was Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 when United States
stopped all military supplies that affected Pakistan much more than India.
Pakistan interpreted this act as an outright betrayal and increased its
efforts to repair its relations with Soviet Union and upgrade its relations
with China.
No
Site
Major Activity
1
Tayurtam
Missile testing site, cosmodrome for space research & Inter Continental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) base
2
Kapustin Yar
Missile testing and launch site
3
Saryshagan*
Air defense missile base and Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) test station
4
Semipalatinsk
Main nuclear testing site
5
Plesetsk
SS-6 ICBM base
6
Sverdlovsk
Major industrial hub and uranium enrichment facility for nuclear weapons
7
Kazan
Soviet bomber base
8
Chelyabinsk
Plutonium production facility for nuclear weapons
9
Novaya Zemlya
Nuclear testing site
10
Severodvinsk
Submarine shipyard
11
Murmansk
Naval base
12
Yurya
ICBM base then under construction, later home of 8th Missile Division
Table: 2 Soviet sites for reconnaissance flight originating from Pakistan
and Turkey. *Soviets used Kapustin Yar site for firing the missiles and
Saryshagan site to test ABM to intercept them.
Conclusion
'You take five years to think about a problem and then three years to act …
You are always too late. You are going to loose many things. You are going
to link us up in the mess too'. Pakistan's Governor General Ghulam Muhammad
to C. L. Sulzberger, 31 January 1955 (88)
'The military commitment to Pakistan was perhaps the worst kind of a plan
and decision we could have made. It was a terrible error, but we now seem
hopelessly involved in it'. President Dwight Eisenhower, January 1957 (89)
Defense relations and intelligence cooperation between United States and
Pakistan during 1950s and 60s had benefits and side effects for both
countries. It evolved over a decade and by 1964, although there was
significant strain on the relations both parties saw benefit of continuation
of the relationship though at a much smaller scale. 'Pakistan still
required U.S. aid for critical development and defense priorities; and the
United States still valued the intelligence-collection facilities that
Pakistan permitted it to operate'. (90) Despite many shortcomings and
significant heartburn on both sides, there were some benefits to both sides.
United States obtained significant strategic intelligence against Soviet
Union from its operations in Pakistan. This contributed towards huge
savings to United States exchequer as 'bomber gap' and 'missile gap'
theories were proven wrong through high altitude reconnaissance. President
Eisenhower in possession of this information was able to hold defense
spending down despite strong pressures from military and Congress. Pakistan
on its parts revolutionized its armed forces in less than a decade from
large scale defense assistance from United States. All three services jumped
from World War II era to modern age of warfare with state of the art war
equipment and first rate training to use equipment. In many areas such as
armor, artillery, Special Forces and air force, Pakistani armed forces
became one of the best in the world. This could not have been achieved
through indigenous resources in such a short period of time.
'The ambivalence, misunderstandings, tensions, and unfulfilled expectations'
affected Pakistan and United States relations during this time period. (91)
Both parties were disappointed in their relationship in 1950s and 60s.
United States expected that by training and equipping Pakistan's armed
forces, it had earned the right that Pakistan should completely align its
interests with United States foreign policy including helping in quarantine
of China. Washington expected that Pakistan will earn the enmity of three
of its powerful neighbors; India, Soviet Union and China in return for
assistance. In addition, United States expected that all the firepower
provided to Pakistan was solely to be used against communists and not
against India. These objectives were quite unrealistic. It was very clear
from as early as 1947 that Pakistan saw its main security threat from India
and all its efforts to modernize its armed forces were with the sole
objective of confronting India. It was naïve on part of Washington to
expect that Pakistan would embark on a policy that would put it in direct
conflict with both Soviet Union and China. Similarly, the assumption that
in case of an all out war with India, Pakistan will keep its new shiny armor
in depots defies any logic.
Pakistan on the other hand also had unrealistic objectives. Privately,
Pakistan's leaders starting from the nation's founding father consistently
presented themselves as bulwark against communism ignoring ground realties
and their own limitations. They used this line to extract maximum defense
and economic aid from United States. They expected that Washington would
equip and train and modernize all of their three services without any
questions asked. They signed secret agreements that clearly stipulated that
the objective of military assistance was against communism but they had no
intention of fulfilling the obligations. They thought that they could
indulge in adventures against India and expected that Washington would not
only keep the weapon pipeline open but give them diplomatic cover in
international arena. This showed complete lack of understanding of global
interests of United States on part of Pakistan's higher decision makers. In
McMahon's words, it is not clear whether Pakistan's 'expectations were a
product of wishful thinking, cultural misperceptions, preoccupation with the
enormity of Pakistan's internal and security needs, a simple blindness to
reality, or a combination of all those factors'. (92) Pakistan's close
defense alliance with United States was one of the factors that pushed
Soviet Union towards close relations with Pakistan's archrival India as well
as Afghanistan; a reality never completely comprehended by Pakistan.
Fifty years down the line and Pakistan and United States are again engaged
in wide ranging defense and intelligence operations in the context of fight
against extremism. One lesson that can be learned from the past such
endeavourers is that each party should be realistic in its objectives as
well as fully comprehend its own as well as other party's limitations.
Exaggerated expectations will invariably result in huge disappointments on
both sides. Every one understands that some intelligence operations need to
be classified, however overall relations between the two countries and
general defense relations should be discussed at different forums so that a
more practical and somewhat transparent relation focusing on common
interests is established. One simple fact which is missing in most
discussions is that no policy can be pursued without minimum consensus from
the population. Conducting all transactions in dark simply adds more
suspicion and confusion and dividends are usually marginal in the long run.
"One rarely has the luxury in diplomacy of being able to choose a course of
action which is all on the 'credit' side of the ledger and entails no
'debits' at all". Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to Chester Bowles,
January 1954 (93)
Notes:
1-Quoted in John E. Persico. Casey: The Lives and Secrets of William J.
Casey: From the OSS to the CIA (New York: Penguin Group, 1990, p. 313
2- Quoted in Michael R. Beschloss. May Day: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the
U-2 Affair (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986), p. 381
3- For detailed discussion of development of U-2 program and its operations
see Gregory W. Pedlow & Donald E. Welzenbach. The CIA and the U-2 Program,
1954-1974 (History Staff Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA). Center
for the Study of Intelligence, 1998 and Chris Pocock. From the Shadows –
Early History of the U-2. Code One Magazine, Volume 17, No 1, January 2002
4- John Ranelagh. The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 311 & 314
5- Francis Gary Powers and Curt Gentry. Operation Over flight (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 46
6- Powers. Operation Over flight, p. 44
7- Alexander Orlov. The U-2 Program: A Russian Officer Remembers. Studies
in Intelligence, Winter 1998-99
8- Powers. Operation Over flight, p. 68
9- Frederick J. Ferrer. The Impact of U.S. Aerial Reconnaissance during the
Early Cold War. Posted at Cold War Museum website
<http://www.rb-29.net/HTML/06CWMConn/LinksPgs/01.IUSARECW.htm>
http://www.rb-29.net/HTML/06CWMConn/LinksPgs/01.IUSARECW.htm)
10- Beschloss. May Day, p. 139
11- Powers. Operation Over flight, p. 4
12- Powers. Operation Over flight, p. 6-7
13- Powers. Operation Over flight, p. 37
14- This conclusion is based on information to the author from Pakistani and
American sources familiar with the project during that time, April & May
2010.
15- M. S. Venkataramani. The American Role in Pakistan, 1947-1958 (Lahore:
Vanguard Books, 1984), p. 334-35
16- Beschloss. May Day, p. 145
17- Powers. Operation Over flight, p. 66 and Ranelagh. The Agency, p. 317
18- Powers. Operation Over flight, p. 75
19- Beschloss. May Day, p. 147
20- Beschloss. May Day, p. 147
21- For details of individual U-2 flights from Pakistan see Table 1.
<http://www.spyflight.co.uk/u2.htm> http://www.spyflight.co.uk/u2.htm
22- William Taubman. Khrushchev: The Man and his Era (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2003), p. 444-445
23- Orlov. The U-2 Program
24- Beschloss. May Day, p. 237-41
25- Orlov. The U-2 Program
26- Powers. Operation Over flight, p. 74-75, details provided in The Trial
of the U-2 (Chicago: Translation World Publishers, 1960) and Walter J.
Boyne. When the U-2 Fell to Earth. Air Force Magazine, Vol. 93, No 4,
April 2010, p. 44-47
27- Ranelagh. The Agency, p. 319
28- Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1976), p. 504
29- Orlov. The U-2 Program
30- For Soviet narrative of this episode see Khrushchev Remembers, pp.
504-511, General Georgi Mikhailov interview in David Wise. The Russian
Behind the Downing of Powers U-2. Los Angeles Times, April 30, 1995 and
Orlov. The U-2 Program. For American narrative see the autobiography of
the U-2 pilot, Powers. Operation Over flight.
31- Beschloss. May Day, p. 33
32- David Wise & Thomas B. Ross. The U-2 Affair (New York: Random House,
1962), p. 113
33- Quoted in Becshloss. May Day, p. 268
34- Quoted in Beschloss. May Day, p. 60
35- Wise & Rose. The U-2 Affair, p. 122
36- Beschloss. May Day, p. 267
37- Ayub Khan. Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967),
p. 171
38- Altaf Gauhar. Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler (Karachi:
Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 142
39- <http://www.spyflight.co.uk/u2.htm> http://www.spyflight.co.uk/u2.htm
40- Communication to author from a retired Air Commodore of Pakistan Air
Force, June 2010.
41- Details of this squadron are at
<http://www.paffalcons.com/articles/paf-no24-elint-squadron.php>
http://www.paffalcons.com/articles/paf-no24-elint-squadron.php
42- This was confirmed by a Pakistani navigator who was involved with these
missions, March 2010 and a U.S. staff member who was stationed in Pakistan
in 1960s, April 2010.
43- Communication from a PAF officer with direct knowledge of the events,
April 2010.
44- Communication to author from a retired Air Commodore of Pakistan Air
Force familiar with the operations, April 2010.
45- The information about RB-57s stationed in Pakistan is based on
communication to author by five retired Air Commodores of Pakistan Air
Force, March, April & May 2010.
46- Quoted in James Bramford. Body of Secrets: Anatomy f the Ultra-secret
National Security Agency (New York: Doubleday, 2001)
47- Harold P. Myers and Gabriel G. Marshall. A Continuing Legacy: Freedom
Through Vigilance. USAFSS to AFISR Agency 1948-2009 posted at AFISR Agency
website. http://www.afisr.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-091130-022.pdf
48- Beschloss. May Day, p. 158 and Bramford. Body of Secrets, p. 47
49- Bramford. Body of Secrets, p. 48-49
50- For some of the details of the operation see, Colonel George L.
Singleton. West Pakistan 1963-65: U-2 Duty. Cold War Times, Vol. 10, Issue
2, May 2010. <http://www.coldwar.org/text_files/ColdwartimesMay2010.pdf>
http://www.coldwar.org/text_files/ColdwartimesMay2010.pdf and website of the
alumni of 6937 <http://6937th.50megs.com/> http://6937th.50megs.com/
51- Communication to author from an American who served at the facility in
1960s, April 2010.
52- Communication to author from an American who served at the facility in
1960s, April 2010.
53- Roedad Khan. A Dream Gone Sour (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1997), p. 16
54- Gauhar. Ayub Khan, p. 142
55- Robert J. McMahon. The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States,
India and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 268
56- cited in McMahon. The Cold War on the Periphery, p. 320
57- Altaf Gauhar. Ayub Khan,, p. 189 & 193
58- Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-1972. Edited and
Annotated by Craig Baxter (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 12
59- Gauhar. Ayub Khan, p. 291
60- Gauhar. Ayub Khan, p. 290-91
61- cited in McMahon. The Cold War on the Periphery, p. 326
62- For the most authoritative account of this little known chapter of the
other cold war, see S. Mahmud Ali. Cold War in the High Himalayas: The
U.S., China and South East Asia in the 1950s (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1999. Ayub Khan also noted this in his diaries, Gauhar. Ayub Khan, p. 142
63- For details of these operations see General Hsichun Mike Hua. The Black
Cat Squadron. Air Power History, Spring 2002 and Major General Jude BK Pao.
U-2 Spy Plane in Taiwan, 10 February 2002 posted at Road Runners
Internationale site <http://area51specialprojects.com/u2-pao.html>
http://area51specialprojects.com/u2-pao.html.
64- Beschloss. May Day, p. 148 & 392
65- Lt. General ® Javed Nasir. Ghauri and Its Aftermath. Defence Journal,
May 1998
66- For details of these now declassified documents see Documents on the
U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System posted at National Security Archive
website http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB7/nsaebb7.htm
67- U.S. Embassy Karachi telegram 980 to Department of State dated November
18, 1964. National Archives, Record Group 59, U.S. Department of State,
Central foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966, File DEF 18-8 US posted at National
Security Archive website.
68- Gauhar. Ayub Khan, p. lii
69- McMahon. The Cold War in the Periphery, p. 335
70- McMahon. The Cold War on the Periphery, p. 309
71- Diaries of Field Marshal Ayub Khan, p. 23
72- Gauhar. Ayub Khan, p. 57
73- Quoted in McMahon. The Cold War on the Periphery, p. 319
74- Beschloss. May Day, p. 155
75- Ranelagh. The Agency, p. 317
76- Bramford. Body of Secrets, p. 44-47
77- For the list of Soviet sites monitored with reconnaissance flights
originating from Pakistan see Table 2
78- Christopher Andrew. For The President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence
and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper
Perennial, 1996), p. 243
79- Beschloss. May Day, p. 145
80- Gauhar. Ayub Khan, p. 142
81- Beschloss. May Day, p. 145
82- Beschloss. May Day, p. 160
83- Beschloss. May Day, p. 323
84- Venkataramani. The American Role in Pakistan, pp. 337-38
85- Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin. The World was Gong Our Way:
The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2005), p.
341
86- Andrew & Mitrokhin. The World Was Going Our Way, p. 342
87- Andrew & Mitrokhin. The World Was Going Our Way, p. 343
88- Quoted in Venkataramani. The American Role in Pakistan, p. 313
89- Memo of discussion at NSC meeting, January 03, 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957,
8:25-28 and FRUS, 1955-1957, 19:397cited in McMahon. The Cold War on the
Periphery, p. 207
90- McMahon. The Cold War on the Periphery, p. 320
91- McMahon. The Cold War on the Periphery, p. 190
92- McMahon. The Cold War on the Periphery, p. 191
93- Cited in McMahon. The Cold War on the Periphery, p. 174
Author's Note about Sources:
U.S. Sources:
- The CIA and the U-2 Program 1954-1974. This is history of the program
based on CIA's own declassified documents and deals with the subject quite
comprehensively.
- Michael R. Beschloss. May Day: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2
Affair (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986). This is the most
authentic and comprehensive account of the U-2 affair based on extensive
research and interviews with many key participants.
- David Wise & Thomas B. Ross. The U-2 Affair (New York: Random House,
1962). This work is remarkable in the sense that it was published in 1962;
just two years after the U-2 incident when no declassified documents were
available. Author's diligent although limited research provided some of the
early information about a secret program.
- Frederick J. Ferrer. The Impact of U.S. Aerial reconnaissance during
the Early Cold War. Cold War Museum. This is a very informative account
of early reconnaissance from an author familiar with the subject due to his
own work in the area.
- Encyclopedic account of the history of NSA with good account of early
years is provided by James Bramford's Body of Secrets: Anatomy f the
Ultra-secret National Security Agency (New York: Doubleday, 2001)
- John Ranelagh. The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1986). This book provides a good segment on CIA's early
programs such as U-2.
- Robert J. McMahon. The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States,
India and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). This is an
excellent account of U.S. relations with Pakistan and India in the period
1947-1965. It gives a unique perspective of how U.S. decision making
process was influenced by cold war, regional conflicts and nightmare task of
balancing relations with Pakistan and India.
- M. S. Venkataramani. The American Role in Pakistan, 1947-1958
(Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1984). This work looks at Pakistan-U.S. relations
from Indian point of view. However, it is a very good account of the
evolution of Pakistan-U.S. defense relations in the formative years of
1947-1958 based on author's painstaking research using original declassified
documents of various U.S. agencies.
Soviet Union Sources:
- Alexander Orlov. The U-2 Program: A Russian Officer Remembers.
Studies in Intelligence, Winter 1998-99. Colonel Orlov provides the first
hand account from Soviet air defense side. He was member of the commission
set up by Soviet leadership to find the drawbacks of air defense in
targeting U-2 just prior to the shooting down of Francis Gary Powers plane
in May 1960.
- The Trial of the U-2 (Chicago: Translation World Publishers,
1960). This work is translation of court proceedings of the trail of
Francis Gary Powers before Military Division of the Supreme Court of the
U.S.S.R., Moscow, August 17-19, 1960. This work provides detailed
information about U-2 which was presented by Soviet authorities at the
trail.
- Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. Translated and Edited
by Strobe Talbot (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976). Khrushchev's
account is based on his secret tape recordings during his last few years
when he was quarantined. These tapes were later smuggled to the west and
translated and published.
- In 1995, David Wise interviewed General Georgi Mikhailov in
Moscow which was published in The Los Angels Times, April 30, 1995. In
1960, Mikhailov was Colonel and deputy chief of operations of air defense
command and was in the room with his commander when U-2 was shot down. He
flew to the crash site the same day and was responsible for collecting all
parts of the crashed plane. Later, he served as Military Attaché in
Washington and in 1977 attended Francis Gary Powers funeral at Arlington in
private capacity. He later became head of the GRU, Soviet military
intelligence in 1980s.
- A valuable source from Soviet side is encyclopedic archives of
KGB published in two volumes when KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin was
extricated by British intelligence from Russia in 1992 after the break up of
Soviet Union. These two volumes; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin.
The Sword and The Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and The Secret History of
KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999) and Christopher Andrew and Vasili
Mitrokhin. The World was Gong Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third
World (New York: Basic Books, 2005) provide a window to KGB operations
during the Cold War. Mitrokhin spent thirty years at KGB and was responsible
for transferring the archives to the new facility. He maintained a large
data base of KGB files, transcripts and notes. I could not find any
significant reference to U-2 and other high altitude reconnaissance
activities in the archives except a note about exchange of Francis Gary
Powers with Russian spy Rudolph Abel. In the second volume of The World
Was Going Our Way, one gets a fair idea of how super powers fought their
battles in Third World countries.
Pakistani Sources:
- Several retired Pakistan Air Force officers provided Pakistani
side of the story. Two pilots known to have flown RB-57 missions; Squadron
leader Muhammad Iqbal and Rashid Mir are not alive. One navigator of RB-57
who flew on the missions provided valuable information. Unavailability of
declassified documents of Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs prevents a
more detailed understanding of Pakistani perspective.
- Ayub Khan, Pakistan's C-in-C and later President of the country
was instrumental in many negotiations with Americans and his diaries give a
glimpse of the thought process from Pakistan side. Three valuable works in
this regard are: Ayub Khan. Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University
Press, 1967), Altaf Gauhar. Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996) and Diaries of Field Marshal
Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-1972. Edited and Annotated by Craig Baxter
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007).
Chinese Sources:
- There are no official Chinese government sources available to
researchers. Two senior nationalist Chinese officers directly involved in
U-2 operations against mainland China wrote the most authentic account of
the operations from direct participants. These two works are General
Hsichun Mike Hua. The Black Cat Squadron. Air Power History, Spring 2002
and Major General Jude BK Pao. U-2 Spy Plane in Taiwan, 10 February 2002
posted at Road Runners Internationale site.
<http://area51specialprojects.com/u2-pao.html>
http://area51specialprojects.com/u2-pao.html.
Acknowledgements:
Special thanks to retired Air Commodore Sajad Haider for his valuable input,
insight and corrections. He was instrumental in writing this article as
conversations with him prompted me to research about the subject. Author
also thanks many Pakistani air force officers as well as Americans for
valuable information and corrections. Special thanks to a source with in
depth knowledge about U.S.-China relations for his insightful comments. All
these sources wish to remain anonymous. Special thanks to Francis Gary
Powers; son of U-2 pilot shot down on May 01, 1960 who runs the Cold War
Museum for his assistance and introduction to some sources who served in
Pakistan during that time period.
Hamid Hussain
July 29, 2010
Defence Journal, August 2010
--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear
of punishment and hope of reward after death." --
Albert Einstein !!!
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