Major General ® Naseerullah Khan Babar (1928-2011)
by
Dr Hamid Hussain
Major General ® Naseerullah Khan Babar died on January 10, 2011 after prolonged illness. He played a very long inning both in the army and political arena. He was at Prince of Wales Royal Indian Military College at Dehra Dun at the time of partition in 1947 and joined the first batch of officers trained at newly established Pakistani military academy at Kakul. He opted for artillery (4th Field Artillery Regiment) after passing out but later joined Army Aviation. He participated in 1965 and 1971 wars winning a Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ) in 1965 and a Bar to his SJ in 1971. He served as Inspector General of Frontier Corps (IGFC) in early 1970s. He retired in 1976 to become Governor of North West Frontier Province (1976-1977). He later joined Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and served as special advisor (1988-1990) and Interior Minister (1993-1996) during Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's governments in 1990s.
During his military career, he was considered a good officer and respected by his peers and juniors. He was a brave officer and in 1965 war he landed his helicopter near an Indian army post and single handedly disarmed an Indian army detachment and marched them towards Pakistani positions. In 1971 war he was wounded and that affected full use of his left arm for rest of his life. When he was interior minister, a group of Afghans high jacked a Pakistani school bus full of children and brought it to embassy of Afghanistan in Islamabad. Babar went alone to the embassy to negotiate with them. During his interaction with highjackers, he asked one of them to have a look at the hand grenade and fiddled with the pin to make it difficult to pull before returning it. He surveyed the whole scene and gave that information to the Special Forces rescue team. In the subsequent shootout all highjackers were killed.
In his political career, though entangled in many controversies, he was never involved in any financial scandal and was respected by even his opponents. He had a certain degree of independent mind and expressed his views candidly. He didn't let political convenience cloud his better judgment. In Pakistan, a very negative and discriminative environment has been created for Ahmadi community (this community has been declared non-Muslim by country's constitution but still hounded and persecuted by all other means whipping public sentiments). In this environment with few exceptions even otherwise decent Pakistanis shun their Ahmadi fellow countrymen. A friend and fellow officer of General Babar who happened to be Ahmadi died. Babar was planning to attend his funeral prayer. He was advised against it by some of his well wishers with argument that it will create political problems for him and the government. A fellow parliament member of a religious party also warned General Babar privately. General Babar replied that the deceased fellow's faith is between him and his creator. He was my colleague and friend and I have some obligation towards him. General Babar attended the funeral.
He was instrumental in two policy issues that were controversial. First was his role in Afghanistan and second operation against Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) in Karachi in early 1990s. His role in Afghanistan was limited to two quite distinct and separate time periods. In early 1970s, as IGFC, he was engaged in a top secret covert plan to arm Afghan dissidents to force Afghan government to back off from Pushtunistan issue. Second engagement in Afghanistan was during mid nineties when he advocated throwing the Pakistani lot with then nascent Taliban movement emerging in Kandahar. He had no role in the most crucial time period of 1978-1989.
I had the pleasure and honor of knowing General Babar. Over the past several years, I had many long one to one sessions with him discussing Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan. This was part of my own efforts to understand Pakistan's engagement in Afghanistan (indeed a very difficult task to decipher personal opinion of participants and separate facts from rhetoric in view of the fact that many important decisions from military high command were conveyed verbally with no written record and retired rather than serving army officers were used as Afghan hands for some important tasks). He was always gracious although we had disagreements about Pakistan's Afghan policy. His view was that of an insider and as an active participant in some of the events he had to justify some of the decisions while mine was that of an outsider but shaped by information from a variety of sources. He had a certain child like smile and whenever I pushed forcefully in advancing my arguments, he would disarm me with that smile.
I agreed with him about the first engagement in early 1970s when objective of training a small cadre of Afghan dissidents was very limited and only directed towards forcing Afghanistan to back off from Pushtunistan issue. Like many other Afghan hands of Pakistan army, he had a rather simplified notion about controlling Afghan proxies despite having the first hand experience of deep fissures of Afghan society and fractiousness of Afghan proxies. He was convinced that if Benazir government was not dismissed in 1996, they would have found a solution to Afghan dilemma. I completely disagreed with him on this issue and pointed to him the obvious. Even in the very early stages in early 1070s when Gulbadin Hikmatyar and Ahmad Shah Massoud were mere young boys getting handouts from their Pakistani handlers, the hatred between these men was mutual and quite visceral. Even at that early stage, both were plotting to assassinate the rival. It reached to a point that General Babar himself threatened Hikmatyar to behave or his dead body may be found in some stream. This was just an example of how Pakistanis felt confident that if they could make leaders from unknown Afghans that they could incinerate them also at will (the same thought process prevailed among the later generation of Pakistani officers).
My view was that a society like Pakistan with unresolved political issues (especially Baluch question), deep fissures along ethnic and sectarian lines, fragile economy, dominant military and almost no diplomatic clout was not in a position to get frontally engaged in a neighboring country. I thought this was a very hazardous course and to continue with such a course Pakistan had to either hang on to the coat tails of a bigger power (i.e. United States or China to provide diplomatic and economic cover) or to defer to the wishes of smaller powers (i.e. Saudi Arabia to keep writing the checks for the project). Both options were full of second and third order consequences that Pakistan could ill afford. Second part of the argument was that in essence Pakistan was acting as a direct participant in the civil war in Afghanistan regardless of the ideological and religious rhetoric. It was simply a matter of time before this blow back will change direction and travel east of the Durand Line (this was long before American B-52s showed up on the skies of Afghanistan and based on early signs of changed political economy of Jihad Incorporated then visible in Pushtun areas of Pakistan). Bob Woodward in his book about CIA Veil: The Secret Wars of CIA, 1981-1987 quotes former CIA director Richard Helms stating that 'Covert action is like a damn good drug. It works, but if you take too much of it, it will kill you'. This one sentence eloquently describes Pakistan's Afghan policy of the last three decades.
General Babar agreed with me on the point that from a practical foreign policy issue, Pakistan's engagement in Afghanistan had become an 'obsession' and a matter of 'faith'. There was no room for periodic evaluation of any given policy and serious consideration of pros and cons of all options. The result was that Pakistan became an active participant in civil war of Afghanistan right from the beginning and continuing on the same path even today. Pakistan's Afghan policy invariably got entangled with domestic issues with corrosive effects on Pakistani state and society and severe strain on professionalism of the army as well as intelligence agencies.
Many Pakistanis and foreigners who disagree with the point of view of Pakistani high command are perplexed as how can an institution continue to shoot itself repeatedly in the foot and never missing the target yet refusing to seriously analyze the benefits and risks of any given policy? My own assessment was that dismemberment of the country in 1971, a humiliating defeat and surrender had left a deep psychological scar on the minds of a generation of Pakistani officers. Some joined Sufi brotherhoods and others tried to regain that lost honor on the killing fields of Afghanistan (some officers involved in Afghanistan had this background). General Babar had different ideas about how Pakistan got stuck in the quicksand of Afghanistan.
A genuine difficult foreign policy issue first became casualty to 'obsession' and 'paranoia' followed by 'delusions of grandeur' and final results are very painful for Pakistan. One fine and respected mid-level officer who did some heavy lifting during recent operations against militants very eloquently summarized the dilemma stating that 'we are paying for the sins of our fathers'.
General Babar was member of the dwindling number of officers in India and Pakistan trained in old school. This group of officers joined their respective armies in independent India and Pakistan immediately after independence. The professional career of these officers was shaped by changes in their respective newly independent nations. In heavens, with his cane in left hand and a broad smile, this old soldier will be welcoming many young soldiers of Pakistan army willingly sacrificing their lives in ongoing operations against militants. Good bye and rest in peace General Babar.
| Lest the young soldiers be strange in heaven, God bids the old soldier they all adored Come to Him and wait for them, clean, new-shriven,
A happy doorkeeper in the House of the Lord. Lest it abash them, the strange new splendor, Lest it affright them, the new robes clean; Here's an old face, now, long-tried, and tender,
A word and a hand-clasp as they troop in. "My boys," he greets them: and heaven is homely,
He their great captain in days gone o'er; Dear is the friend's face, honest and comely, Waiting to welcome them by the strange door. |
| The Old Soldier by Katharine Tynan
|
Hamid Hussain
February 05, 2011
Defence Journal, March 2011
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