| February 13, 2011
There were three questions asked by three quite different acquaintances in the last three days. First one was about rapidly changing scene and I completed that about 12 hours before the curtain fell after first act of play and Mubarak announced his decision to leave the stage. Second was about Omar Suleiman and third one about impact on other countries including Pakistan. I have put all three together in one.
| ||
| |
February 10, 2011
Dear Sir;
Thanks for your kind e-mail. Like many others I'm just a spectator of events. Change is the essence of human nature and every nation goes through such cycles. I'll just summarize several dimensions of current situation in Egypt;
'Man's history is waiting in patience for the triumph of the insulted man.' Rabindranath Tagore
- Internal: This is the dominant factor and people are fed up seeing one face for over three decades no matter what good or bad Hosni Mubarak did for the country. Since the single point of agreement among Egyptians of different backgrounds is departure of Mubarak therefore there is no discussion of any other details. Prospect of change brings hope but at the same times generate fear and that is fear of unknown. I'm sure many Egyptians are contemplating on these lines. The problem with prolonged authoritarianism is that it does not allow even rudimentary alternatives to flourish that can replace it in a non-violent fashion. Here lies the risk of chaos and fragmentation along existing fault lines of the society. In case of Egypt, there are three main fault lines (Brotherhood version / non-Brotherhood version political discourse, haves / haves not in view of huge economic disparity and Muslim/non-Muslim in view of a significant Coptic Christian community).
Hopeful signs are active involvement of youth, amazing ability of crowds consisting of thousands of people to organize and remain peaceful. If these positive trends can be merged with a political compromise among various groups, then there is every reason to hope that a more stable and peaceful Egypt will emerge. Egyptians deserve that. With the exception of Brotherhood (probably 25-30 in their camp) there is no other political group that can cross the 15 percent threshold. In such situation if a reasonably fair election is held normally the most organized group get more than fair share that means that Brotherhood may come with 35-45% voting legitimacy. So far Brotherhood has kept a low profile and will likely wait until elections to unfurl their banner openly and with vigor. They will negotiate with current regime as interim measure and wait to get into the corridors of power before they attempt to remove all elements of Mubarak regime.
The wild card is how the current elite is going to navigate. If army (CGS Lt. General Hafez Anan is the first among equals in the group of senior officers and will be key player) and Omar Suleiman make a deal then they will offer the sacrifice of Mubarak as well as C-in-C & Defence Minister Muhammad Hussain Tantawi to the new gods on the altar of popular protest. Suleiman is an old hand with close connections with regional players and U.S. All these players once convinced that Mubarak is a dead horse will be more than happy on put their bets on Suleiman (cooperating with army to ensure stability). This decision needs to be implemented sooner than later because if even a smaller segment of the protestors increase the ante then they may increase their demands and a complete break from the past asking for even departure of Suleiman. Everyone though not happy but can be comfortable with this transition. Another possibility is that senior military generals headed by Lt. General Anan decide that it is time to step-in and a coup is launched. So far there is some suspicion but still lot of good will towards army and a coup will be welcome. However, this option also has a narrow window because if army leadership send too many signals of support for Mubarak then they will loose the goodwill making their task difficult in near future.
- Regional:
Israel: In the last three decades peace with Egypt was a strong pillar of Israel's strategy. As usual Israelis are quite but any Israeli strategic thinker worth his salt will be working overtime. The main focus will be working out several contingency plans for uncertain future of an otherwise a stable front. These contingencies will likely include full redeployment of IDF on Egyptian/Gaza border in case new government decides to stop cooperation to the unlikely scenario of emergence of Islamist government dominated by Muslim Brotherhood. The argument is that to divert attention from intractable domestic problems, Islamists may open up the old bogey of conflict with Israel making that front hot again. In the current set up, to punish Gaza for electing Hamas, Egypt played a crucial role. Some estimate that Egyptian blockade of Gaza is as harsh if not worse than blockade on Israeli side. In my view, the transition government will be busy in internal challenges and will not like to increase difficulties and will stick to status quo with the exception of some easing of Gaza blockade from Egyptian side. The new more permanent set up in Egypt (regardless of the type) if rational enough will adapt a middle course. They will likely follow the Turkey's example. Peace with Israel is in Egypt's interest also and any escalation will be disastrous for Egypt. They will decrease diplomatic and intelligence cooperation with Israelis but keep the peace. However, one thing is clear that new Egyptian set up will not continue to act as border security force for Israel. They will open the border with Gaza to allow everything except arms (government will not allow it but smugglers will try to bring in resulting in increased friction between Egypt & Israel). A more optimistic view is that an Islamist influence Egyptian government may have a moderating influence on Hamas. Fully aware that escalation by Hamas in Gaza will negatively influence nascent new Egyptian set up, Egyptian Islamists & Hamas may find it in their interests to keep Gaza front quite.
- U.S.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, Washington has very little influence on events on the ground. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell summed up the dilemma in one sentence that 'people are tired of getting slapped by U.S. They have stopped listening to us'. So far, focus of protestors is strictly limited to internal issues. U.S. popularity graph is below zero in Egypt but so far there have been no vocal ant-American or anti-Israel rhetoric has been injected in the movement. It will be better if Egyptians focus on their internal problems and keep working relations with everybody. Washington will work with any set up despite differences. If relations are not completely put on hot side, Washington will continue to provide assistance to military as this will be seen as an insurance against instability.
'We expect men to be wrong about the most important changes through which they live.' Harold Lasswel
Warm Regards,
Hamid
PART II
Omar Suleiman; Omar Who?
Omar is the dark prince of Egypt. He headed Military Intelligence followed by a long career as head of General Intelligence Directorate known as Mukhabarat. He spent most of his career in shadows and until very recently he was not known to outside world. He is an enthusiastic fan of Ernest Hemingway; therefore it will not be out of place to explain him and Egypt's near term prospects in Hemingway's words.
Omar's Modus Operandi of last three decades:
'There is no hunting like the hunting of man, and those who have hunted armed men long enough and liked it, never care for anything else thereafter.' Ernest Hemingway
Major deficiency of Omar's' modus operandi of last three decades:
'No weapon has ever settled a moral problem. It can impose a solution but it cannot guarantee it to be a just one.' Ernest Hemingway
Omar's Mistake:
'When people talk, listen completely. Most people never listen.' Ernest Hemingway
Omar's Future:
'You can wipe out your opponents. But if you do it unjustly you become eligible for being wiped out yourself.' Ernest Hemingway Next few months will be interesting. It is likely that there will be some internal power struggle between young senior officers on one hand and Omar and octogenarian Defence Minister Hussain Tantawi on the other. Army brass may decide to push both Omar and Tantawi off the board by asking them to get on the plane for a comfortable exile or throw them to the wolves on the streets of Egypt. Tantawi may have no fire left in him but Omar is neither a fool nor feint hearted. If he decides to dig in he has the capability to engage in the kind of Byzantine intrigues that are the stuff of the legends. Washington, Riyadh and Tel Aviv may also prefer to work with the devil they know. In my view, even if Omar has no such intentions, it is best to ease him out sooner rather than later. Old guard is on a very shaky ground and a little push by army will do the trick with little collateral damage. On the other hand, if Omar is able to assemble sorcerer's apprentices, we will see much more blood down the road. It is also better for all outside players to work with the new set up that represents wishes of Egyptians. Off course there will be more jaw jaw when dealing with new rulers but that is still a better option. It is the fear of unknown that is giving sleepless nights to many.
Two major potential pitfalls that Egypt must avoid:
'The first panacea for a mismanaged nation is inflation of the currency; the second is war. Both bring a temporary prosperity; both bring a permanent ruin. But both are the refuge of political and economic opportunists.' Ernest Hemingway
There is a risk that next ruling elite may embark on pleasing disgruntled elements of society through reckless economic measures without finding the means to pay for it. Other potential pitfall is to start anti-Israel rhetoric to divert attention from domestic difficulties. Both should be avoided at all costs. Once euphoria is over then serious and painful measures will be needed to bring society together on a path of progress. It is almost certain that now different visions will be presented for Egypt by competing groups. Resurgence of nationalistic and patriotic fervor should be channeled towards positive and constructive measures. Egypt's own history should be a lesson. After 1948 defeat, young revolutionaries blamed everything on the old guard and took control of power levers. Gemal Abdul Nasser rallied his nation but then got carried away by his own rhetoric. The result was disastrous defeats at the hand of Israelis sending the whole nation into prolonged collective depression, failure to develop political compromise resulting in ruthless persecution of Muslim Brotherhood and getting entangled in regional rivalries with disastrous engagement in Yemen's civil war. He didn't die from a heart attack but from broken heart.
Hope:
'The only thing that could spoil a day was people. People were always the limiters of happiness except for the very few that were as good as spring itself.' Ernest Hemingway
If some of these few good people can guide the new Egypt, their own country and everybody else will be better off.
Food for thought for all of us lesser mortals:
'There are events which are so great that if a writer has participated in them his obligation is to write truly rather than assume the presumption of altering them with invention.' Ernest Hemingway
Hamid Hussain
February 12, 2011
PART III
No two situations are alike. Only common denominator in most countries in Middle East & North Africa is extreme frustration among general population due to variety of reasons and lack of legitimacy of ruling governments. However, each country is unique in its history, demographics etc. It is likely that general awareness about changes in Tunisia and Egypt will affect other countries. The nature of response in different countries will depend on local factors (i.e. in Bahrain majority Shia population will use sectarian identity to pressure minority Sunni ruling family. On the other hand, it will be reverse in case of Syria where majority Sunni population will use their own sectarian identity to push minority Alawi rulers. In Jordan, local Bedouins fearful of take over by majority Palestinian population will either throw their lot with Royal family or anchor on tribal identity and so on) and response of rulers. Best way is gradual proactive transition by rulers as in modern times you can not freeze a nation. If you don't allow change in natural way then you risk seismic shifts and volcanic changes.
Case of Pakistan is a bit different. If issue is related to a single person then mass protest can achieve its objective easily in modern times and with very little damage. Case in point is departure of General Mussharraf. If protest is about more broader economic and political issues then the most likely outcome of a large scale protest will be a military coup. The reason is an intact and robust military organization and absence of minimum consensus and viable political alternatives. Pakistan's problem has been issue of national integration. In such circumstances if established state structures are weakened by a sudden shift then centrifugal forces get traction. Case in point is successful secession in 1971. In the absence of minimum consensus, this is the most feared outcome. Currently, the most alienated group is Baluchis but in view of very small numbers they can not achieve it solely through violent means. The risk is not outright secession but that as state is forced to retreat and all pillars of state start crumbling from massive unrest then vacuum will be filled in pockets by different groups in different parts of the country (i.e. armed militants carving out their own fiefdoms at the periphery of the state and others such as ethnic Muhajir and Pushtun forces carving out their own space in large Karachi). If a state with a dominant military gets entangled in violent conflict on several fronts both internal and external, then only logical outcome of severe strain is a military coup. In case of Pakistan combination of two very unique factors; presence of very strong armed militant groups and nuclear weapons invariably means that everybody and his cousin will be seriously interested in the business of Pakistan. In my view, mass protest in case of Pakistan will increase rather than decrease problems of Pakistan. Focus should be on fundamental issues rather than keep changing faces at the top. Civilian ruling elite has to provide at least bare minimum i.e. fair security and some sort of economic activity (along with curtailment of absurd life style at state's expense) and military elite should work overtime to disentangle itself from self woven cobweb.
'Change can be a crisis leading to fragmentation or it can be a new dawn. It all depends on how you bring about this change'.
Regards,
Hamid
February 13, 2011
No comments:
Post a Comment