| Implications of the F-16 deal By Javid Husain As was to be expected, the Pakistan Foreign Office welcomed on August 3 the approval by the US Congress of the sale of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan and rejected the impression that unprecedented conditions had been accepted by Islamabad to acquire them.
According to the proposal conveyed to the US Congress by the Bush administration, the deal would involve the sale of 18 new F-16 aircraft with the option of an additional 18 new aircraft. It also includes a US support package for up to 26 used F-16s, a munitions package, an upgrade package for Pakistans current fleet of 34 F-16s and logistical support. The total cost of the deal would be about $5.1 billion.
It is significant that US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in a letter addressed to the US Congress in July 2006 stressed that prior to the delivery of the F-16 aircraft to Pakistan, the latter will be asked to provide a written guarantee that the aircraft would not be used to carry nuclear warheads. The US would also make sure before the delivery of the aircraft and the associated equipment to Pakistan that the aircraft will not be misused and that the aircraft technology will not be transferred to a third country.
Separately, US assistant secretary of state for political military affairs, John Hillen, during a hearing before the House international relations committee on July 20, pointed out that the F-16 aircraft deal had been subjected to a special security plan for Pakistan containing over a dozen new and unprecedented elements. These conditions include, among others, a US presence at Pakistani bases and facilities for a very enhanced end-use monitoring programme, prior approval of the US government for F-16 aircraft flights out of Pakistan or for participation in exercises and operations with third nations, and a two-man rule for access to the F-16 aircraft equipment and munitions in the restricted areas earmarked for them at Pakistani bases and facilities.
Mr Hillen also made two other interesting points during the congressional hearing. He remarked that the US wanted to have access and influence into Pakistan and other nations like Pakistan through this building of this strategic and military-to-military relationshipprecisely to prevent China from having that kind of relationship. He added that the US had not provided to Pakistan, as part of this deal, technologies that would allow the F-16 to be used in offensive ways to penetrate air space of another country that was highly defended.
One of the main objectives of the above mentioned security plan is to prevent any transfer of technology to a third country, particularly China. To this extent, the US is within its rights in demanding assurances from Pakistan. It seems, however, that the provisions of the security plan go much further than that.
Some of these restrictions, specially the guarantee to be provided by the government of Pakistan that the aircraft will not be used to carry nuclear weapons and US presence at Pakistani bases and facilities to monitor the actual use of the aircraft and the associated equipment, severely weaken their deterrent value. The assurance given by Mr Hillen to the US Congress that the F-16 aircraft to be provided to Pakistan would not include technologies that would allow them to penetrate the air space of a highly defended country further detracts from their deterrent value. If India is indeed such a highly defended country one wonders at the rationale of acquiring F-16s having such deficiencies.
The strategic implications of the F-16 deal are even more worrisome. This deal in fact would increase our dependence on the US in the acquisition of advanced weapon systems which is not very reassuring considering the past unhappy history in which Washington on a number of occasions subjected us to an arms embargo when we were badly in need of American military equipment. This happened during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war when we were the so-called most-allied ally of the US, and again in late 1970s and in 1990 because of our nuclear programme. What is the guarantee that tomorrow if some differences of a fundamental nature crop up between Pakistan and the US, Washington will not again subject us to an arms embargo?
The conclusion that the US would not impose an arms embargo on Pakistan during the next 30 years or so, which is the effective life of the F-16 aircraft, can be valid if we assume that the world, that is to say the international and regional security environment, will remain more or less unchanged and that the US will continue to need Pakistans services in the war on terrorism or similar enterprise. This is indeed a bold assumption which may be proved wrong by the fast changing strategic environment in Asia.
A more likely explanation for the assumption that we would not be the target of another US arms embargo is that we have resigned ourselves to a subservient relationship vis-a-vis the US for the foreseeable future. Our acceptance of large-scale assistance from the US in return for the services being rendered by us in the war on terrorism has once again established our status as a US satellite. Pakistans designation as a major non-Nato ally has further confirmed this status. Our decision to purchase the additional F-16 aircraft is an indication of our readiness to remain in this subservient status for the foreseeable future.
Obviously, the satellite status that we seem to have opted for is likely to restrict our manoeuvrability in the handling of foreign affairs. This is already evident in the conduct of our foreign policy on issues which are of significant or critical importance to the United States in the region in which we are located or on issues of interest to the Islamic world.
Considering that the later part of the 21st century is likely to witness growing US-China rivalry in Asia and keeping in view the critical importance of Pakistans strategic ties with China, it is also important to assess the implications of Pakistans growing dependence on the US, as reflected by the F-16 deal, for our vital relationship with China.
At best, future developments would require a very careful balancing act on our part to manage simultaneously the competing demands of our relations with the US and China. In the worst case scenario, our growing reliance on the US for meeting our security needs may have unwelcome consequences for Pakistan-China relations or may confront our policymakers with painful choices.
The F-16 deal also reflects a fundamental flaw in our national security strategy which historically has suffered and continues to suffer from over-emphasis on its military dimension to the neglect of political, economic and diplomatic dimensions. Since I have already written on this subject in earlier articles there is perhaps no need to go into this issue once again in the interest of brevity. Suffice it to say that our leadership does not appear to have drawn the right lessons from our own history or from the demise of the Soviet Union. The USSR disintegrated not because it was short of advanced weaponry but because its weak economic foundations and fragile political system could not sustain the heavy military super-structure of state.
Unfortunately, we seem to be repeating the strategic blunders of the Soviet Union. There cannot be any other explanation for spending an enormous amount of $5.1 billion of our own resources on the purchase of the F-16 aircraft and the associated equipment and munitions when one third of the population is living in miserable conditions under the poverty level, when roughly half the population is illiterate and when most of the people are denied access to basic health facilities and clean drinking water.
Pakistans average per annum GDP growth rate during the period 1999-2006 was 5.2 per cent (despite the favourable external circumstances in the aftermath of 9/11 in the form of increased inflow of developmental assistance and home remittances, and rescheduling of debts) as against 4.6 per cent achieved during the 1990s under civilian governments notwithstanding the economic sanctions imposed on Pakistan in October 1990 and May 1998. India, whose economic performance was much better during this period, achieved a GDP growth rate of 7.7 per cent in 2005.
Even more disturbing from the point of view of national security is the climate of political instability in the country marked by the involvement of the armed forces in politics, the weakening of state institutions, the disregard of the principle of primacy of representative institutions which is vital for the functioning of democracy, the concentration of power in the hands of an individual resulting in arbitrary decisions, rampant corruption, deterioration in law and order, and the growing disharmony among the units of the federation.
In a nutshell, the F-16 deal would make available to Pakistan a weapon system of questionable deterrent value in view of the severe restrictions imposed by Washington and our past experience in dealing with the US. It would have adverse strategic repercussions by increasing our dependence on the US for meeting our security needs and thereby reducing our manouevrability in the management of foreign affairs.
This can have extremely deleterious effects on Pakistans security in a situation where our national interests clash with those of the US. Above all, it reflects a dangerous mindset on the part of our policymakers who consider national security synonymous with the accumulation of advanced weaponry irrespective of its economic and political costs. The need of the hour is to adopt a grand strategy which combines its political, military, economic and diplomatic dimensions in an optimum whole to safeguard our national security and promote our national interests. ____________________
The author is a former ambassador. The article appeared in DAWN newspaper. |
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