January 29, 2011 | 2207 GMT
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http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110129-the-egyptian-unrest-a-special-report?utm_source=SpecialReport&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=110129&utm_content=readmore&elq=4b463a46b1964770bc91ac7c9de67b56
· The Egypt Unrest
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak remains the lifeblood of the
demonstrators, who still number in the tens of thousands in downtown
Cairo and in other major cities, albeit on a lesser scale. After being
overwhelmed in the Jan. 28 Day of Rage protests, Egypt's internal
security forces — with the anti-riot paramilitaries of the Central
Security Forces (CSF) at the forefront — were glaringly absent from
the streets Jan. 29. They were replaced with rows of tanks and armored
personnel carriers carrying regular army soldiers. Unlike their CSF
counterparts, the demonstrators demanding Mubarak's exit from the
political scene largely welcomed the soldiers. Despite Mubarak's
refusal to step down Jan. 28, the public's positive perception of the
military, seen as the only real gateway to a post-Mubarak Egypt,
remained. It is unclear how long this perception will hold, especially
as Egyptians are growing frustrated with the rising level of
insecurity in the country and the army's limits in patrolling the
streets.
There is more to these demonstrations than meets the eye. The media
will focus on the concept of reformers staging a revolution in the
name of democracy and human rights. These may well have brought
numerous demonstrators into the streets, but revolutions, including
this one, are made up of many more actors than the liberal voices on
Facebook and Twitter.
After three decades of Mubarak rule, a window of opportunity has
opened for various political forces — from the moderate to the extreme
— that preferred to keep the spotlight on the liberal face of the
demonstrations while they maneuver from behind. As the Iranian
Revolution of 1979 taught, the ideology and composition of protesters
can wind up having very little to do with the political forces that
end up in power. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (MB) understands well the
concerns the United States, Israel and others share over a political
vacuum in Cairo being filled by Islamists. The MB so far is proceeding
cautiously, taking care to help sustain the demonstrations by relying
on the MB's well-established social services to provide food and aid
to the protesters. It simultaneously is calling for elections that
would politically enable the MB. With Egypt in a state of crisis and
the armed forces stepping in to manage that crisis, however, elections
are nowhere near assured. What is now in question is what groups like
the Muslim Brotherhood and others are considering should they fear
that their historic opportunity could be slipping.
One thing that has become clear in the past several hours is a trend
that STRATFOR has been following for some time in Egypt, namely, the
military's growing clout in the political affairs of the state. Former
air force chief and outgoing civil aviation minister Ahmed Shafiq, who
worked under Mubarak's command in the air force (the most privileged
military branch in Egypt), has been appointed prime minister and
tasked with forming the new government. Outgoing Intelligence Chief
Omar Suleiman, who has long stood by Mubarak, is now vice president, a
spot that has been vacant for the past 30 years. Meanwhile, Defense
Minister Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi (who oversees the
Republican Guard) and Egypt's chief of staff of the armed forces, Lt.
Gen. Sami Annan — who returned to Cairo Jan. 29 after a week of
intense discussions with senior U.S. officials — are likely managing
the political process behind the scenes. More political shuffles are
expected, and the military appears willing for now to give Mubarak the
time to arrange his political exit. Until Mubarak finally does leave,
the unrest in the streets is unlikely to subside, raising the question
of just how much more delay from Mubarak the armed forces will
tolerate.
The important thing to remember is that the Egyptian military, since
the founding of the modern republic in 1952, has been the guarantor of
regime stability. Over the past several decades, the military has
allowed former military commanders to form civilian institutions to
take the lead in matters of political governance but never has
relinquished its rights to the state.
Now that the political structure of the state is crumbling, the army
must directly shoulder the responsibility of security and contain the
unrest on the streets. This will not be easy, especially given the
historical animosity between the military and the police in Egypt. For
now, the demonstrators view the military as an ally, and therefore
(whether consciously or not) are facilitating a de facto military
takeover of the state. But one misfire in the demonstrations, and a
bloodbath in the streets could quickly foil the military's plans and
give way to a scenario that groups like the MB quickly could exploit.
Here again, we question the military's tolerance for Mubarak as long
as he is the source fueling the demonstrations.
Considerable strain is building on the only force within the country
that stands between order and chaos as radical forces rise. The
standing theory is that the military, as the guarantor of the state,
will manage the current crisis. But the military is not a monolithic
entity. It cannot shake its history, and thus cannot dismiss the
threat of a colonel's coup in this shaky transition.
The current regime is a continuation of the political order, which was
established when midranking officers and commanders under the
leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, a mere colonel in the armed forces,
overthrew the British-backed monarchy in 1952. Islamist sympathizers
in the junior ranks of the military assassinated his successor, Anwar
Sadat, in 1981, an event that led to Mubarak's presidency.
The history of the modern Egyptian republic haunts Egypt's generals
today. Though long suppressed, an Islamist strand exists amongst the
junior ranks of Egypt's modern military. The Egyptian military is,
after all, a subset of the wider society, where there is a significant
cross- section that is religiously conservative and/or Islamist. These
elements are not politically active, otherwise those at the top would
have purged them.
But there remains a deep-seated fear among the military elite that the
historic opening could well include a cabal of colonels looking to
address a long-subdued grievance against the state, particularly its
foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States and Israel. The midranking
officers have the benefit of having the most direct interaction — and
thus the strongest links — with their military subordinates, unlike
the generals who command and observe from a politically dangerous
distance. With enough support behind them, midranking officers could
see their superiors as one and the same as Mubarak and his regime, and
could use the current state of turmoil to steer Egypt's future.
Signs of such a coup scenario have not yet surfaced. The army is still
a disciplined institution with chain of command, and many likely fear
the utter chaos that would ensue should the military establishment
rupture. Still, those trying to manage the crisis from the top cannot
forget that they are presiding over a country with a strong precedent
of junior officers leading successful coups. That precedent becomes
all the more worrying when the regime itself is in a state of collapse
following three decades of iron-fisted rule.
The United States, Israel and others will thus be doing what they can
behind the scenes to shape the new order in Cairo, but they face
limitations in trying to preserve a regional stability that has
existed since 1978. The fate of Egypt lies in the ability of the
military to not only manage the streets and the politicians, but also
itself.
Read more: The Egyptian Unrest: A Special Report | STRATFOR
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