A piece about paramilitary force; Frontier Corps for the beginners
interested in the Pakistan's tribal area.
Regards,
Hamid
Frontier Scouts
Hamid Hussain
'War is the great auditor of institutions'. Corelli Barnett
Paramilitary forces of Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa (KPK) and Baluchistan are named
Frontier Corps (FC). Each organization is headed by a major general rank
officer seconded from the army for two to three years duration. In the last
few years, Frontier Corps of both provinces are engaged in operations
against militants although the nature of conflict as well as organizational
structure is quite different in each province. In KPK, FC is recruited from
Pushtuns of settled and tribal areas and operating in areas inhabited by
Pushtuns. In Baluchistan, FC is mainly recruited from Pushtuns of settled
areas of KPK but operates in area dominated by Baluch, Brauhis and Pushtuns.
Now other ethnic groups are being recruited in FC-Baluchistan. The FC in
Kyber-Puhtunkhwa (FC-KPK) is now changing its name to Frontier Scouts. This
was the original name of the corps when it was organized over a hundred
years ago.
FC-KPK evolved as a unique organization during British Raj to patrol tribal
territories. It was an irregular force recruited from Pushtuns of tribal
and settled areas and officered by British officers of the army. Later,
when commissions were granted to Indian officers, a small number of these
officers mainly of Pushtun heritage were also posted to FC-KPK. In 1947,
new dominion of Pakistan moved out regular troops stationed in tribal areas.
The administrative structure headed by Political Agent continued to function
and local levies and FC-KPK was the security arm of the administrative
apparatus of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The role of FC-KPK
was limited to maintenance of law and order in FATA and some anti-smuggling
operations. Career oriented army officers usually went for command, staff
and instructional appointments and FC-KPK was considered as a backwater and
a dead end street. It attracted some eccentric officers but overall stint
at FC was not considered a career booster appointment. Some wings of FC-KPK
operating on traditional smuggling routes between Pakistan and Afghanistan
made some extra money on the sideline. Military high command was focused
on main threat on eastern border against India and major resources were
directed towards enhancing armor and artillery components to meet this
threat. FC-KPK was a low priority engaged in normal peacetime activities.
Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 changed the security dynamics
of the region. Interests of Pakistan, United States, western countries,
Saudi Arabia and China converged in this regard. Intelligence agents of all
these countries acting as 'sorcerer's apprentices' contributed towards the
'witch's brew' in Afghanistan according to their own fears and capabilities.
Volunteers from different Muslim countries were recruited and trained for
Afghan operation. These people were allowed to settle in the FATA areas for
training, administration and launching into Afghanistan. In due time, these
new power centers got entrenched in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan's tribal
areas.
After United States invasion of Afghanistan, when the militants were kicked
out of Afghanistan they returned to resettle in FATA and were welcomed as
heroes. In general, the tribal population viewed US presence in Afghanistan
as occupation and continued to side with the militants for a while. The
warlords on their return emerged as new power centers. They started to
settle local disputes and gradually expanded their influence. This set
aside the authority of the political agent, the Khassadars were threatened
and levies collapsed. The FC-KPK and the Army were confused and a time of
indifference set in. In 2002 elections, a coalition of religio-political
parties named Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) formed provincial government in
KPK. In the absence of general public support, army was left with deals,
negotiations and agreements. The last of this exercise was the resurrection
of Sufi Muhammad and essentially handing over the settled areas of whole
Malakand division to militants. These measures failed to contain the
situation and military leadership finally woke up to realize that large
tract of country's territory was essentially surrendered to non-state power
holders.
In mid 1990s, some mid-level intelligence officers warned about increasing
nexus of Afghan militants with their Pakistani counterparts as well as
international militants from Arab countries, Chechnya, Central Asian
Republics and even Chinese Uighurs. A small number of intelligence
officers saw the establishment and expansion of militant infrastructure in
FATA as a potential future security problem for Pakistan. This was long
before U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. However, military leadership was
focused on India and paid no attention to this emerging threat. FC-KPK
entered the battlefield in FATA unprepared for the challenge and vicious
onslaught of hardcore and battle trained militants came as a rude awakening
to FC-KPK and Pakistani military brass. FC-KPK was inducted hastily into
the battle without adequate resources and clear mission from higher decision
makers. The result was catastrophic with not only heavy casualties but
morale went down the drain and by 2008 there were 4000 desertions from
FC-KPK.
In the early part of the crisis, some senior officers of both the army and
FC-KPK were in a state of denial despite detailed reports from local
intelligence outfits about expansion of foreign militants in different
tribal agencies. In the absence of appreciation of the threat and a robust
proactive approach, military operations in FATA were essentially reactive in
nature. Militants fully aware of potential threat from traditional tribal
leadership went on offensive and started to eliminate local leadership.
Death and displacement of tribesmen took away the eyes and ears of the
government and to some extent military was forced to operate blindly.
It took sometime before strategic reorientation at the highest level and
adjustments at tactical level by local commanders retrieved the situation
and downward drift was reversed. Learning curve at all levels was quite
sharp and in the last two years militants have been pushed from major
population centers. Militants not only declared open war against Pakistani
state but also against local power holders. Indiscriminate violence against
general population including assassinations, beheadings and bombings of
tribal gatherings including jirgas (tribal assemblies), games and even
funerals against all traditional norms generated only anger, disgust and
revulsion among tribesmen and militants lost a lot of ground in a very short
span. It was only after the significant degradation of militant's fire
power by military operations that local tribal defense organizations started
to organize and function.
FC-KPK underwent baptism of fire fighting militants entrenched in FATA and
finally gained the balance in 2008. In the fall of 2008, FC-KPK started the
'operational season' by launching a full scale operation against entrenched
militants in Bajaur. This was followed by operations in Dir and Buner.
These operations by FC-KPK set the platform for the full scale military
operation in Swat by the Army. Winds of chaos were blowing in every agency
and when kicked from one area of operations, militants were falling back in
another tribal agency and very soon every agency was on fire. Military
along with FC-KPK is now operating against militants in Bajaur, South
Waziristan, Mohmand, Khyber, Aurakzai and Kurram agencies. The last
remaining wild frontier is now North Waziristan, where things are still
shrouded in some mystery. However, sooner of later this swamp also needs to
be cleared of alligators.
In the last two years, FC-KPK is undergoing a revolutionary transformation.
Military leadership finally understood the importance of FC-KPK in current
security dilemma and provided necessary resources. In 2008, Major General
Tariq Khan took over as Inspector General Frontier Corps-Khyber Puhktunkwa
(IGFC-KPK) and was instrumental in fundamental organizational changes. These
changes are wide ranging including organization, equipment, doctrine and
training.
In view of large area of responsibility, four sector head quarters each
commanded by a Brigadier are raised. South Sector with headquarters at Tank
covers South Waziristan, South West Sector with headquarter at Bannu covers
North Waziristan, Kurram and Aurakzai agencies, Central Sector with
headquarter at Warsak covers Khyber and Mohmand agencies and Northern Sector
headquartered at Timergara covers Dir, Bajaur and Chitral. Each sector is
provided with its own resources for recruitment, training and operational
capability to operate independently.
Training of FC-KPK has been thoroughly overhauled to prepare the troops for
changed security landscape in their area of operation. Sector headquarters
recruit and train troops. Efforts are underway to start a dedicated
Officers Training School (OTS) for FC-KPK. The concept is based on
selecting potential officers from tribesmen and with special focus on
counterinsurgency in tribal areas. First batch of fifty officers will start
training soon. A stint at FC-KPK is given special consideration in career
prospects of army officers and quality of officers serving in FC-KPK has
markedly improved. Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) are being incorporated
into scout units on permanent basis. In addition, small numbers of tanks,
artillery pieces and helicopters are being provided to FC-KPK to broaden
their operational capability. Special Operations Group (SOG) starting with
three companies is operational and five more companies will be raised and
trained. New concept such as induction of specialized troops in the battle
area like sniper teams is introduced. Salary, accommodations and benefits
for the troops has been improved significantly to attract best candidates
for FC-KPK recruitment.
Currently, FC-KPK has about 50'000 troops organized in fourteen Scout Units
(another unit Bhittani Rifles is being raised). Each scout unit is
commanded by a Colonel rank officer and consists of two to six wings. Each
wing is commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel rank officer. There is flexibility
in numbers and deployment of individual scout units depending on the
operational needs in their area of operation. Local commanders are given
some operational independence and rather than following the army's strict
chain of command, they have direct access to IGFC. Transformation of FC-KPK
in the last two years is already paying the dividends and morale has
markedly improved (in the force of over 50'000 there were only 41
desertions.) FC-KPK is operating more aggressively and effectively against
militants and more area is being added to its responsibility. In the past,
when FC units were deployed alongside army, scouts sometimes went to the
border of recklessness to prove that they are not inferior to regular
troops. FC-KPK has earned respect from regular army troops in view of its
improved performance in the last two years.
Service rivalries and struggle for resources among various services is norm
in every army and Pakistan army is no exception. A careful analysis of army
operations of the last few years and future requirements of the security of
FATA suggest that FC-KPK will play a crucial role. Army's ticket out of
FATA is FC-KPK and if this one simple fact is kept in mind then normal
friction can be handled in a mature and professional way.
FC-KPK will be the major force in the future to maintain stability of FATA
and keeping the winds of instability affecting the settled areas. It is
important that committed resources for FC-KPK are not diverted to avoid
impact on current pace of transformation. In addition, professional
officers with right aptitude and clarity of thought should be selected for
senior positions at FC-KPK to avoid slipping back to the days of
complacency. Normal changes at the top should not affect overall
orientation of FC-KPK. Selecting right officers for important command
positions such as IGFC, Deputy IGFC, sector commanders and commandants will
be crucial to maintain current momentum.
In the one hundred year history of FC, every crisis brought changes to the
organization making it a better force. Seismic shifts have occurred in the
national security dilemma of Pakistan and militancy is now number one threat
to country's social, political and economic health. In the changed threat
environment, FC-KPK has a unique role to play in the national security of
Pakistan. If fully supported by military leadership with adequate resources
and a dedicated group of professional officers at different levels of
command, in due time, FC-KPK can become a robust, effective, professional
and proud organization defending western frontier. This will dramatically
reduce the need for induction of regular army troops in tribal areas at the
time of crisis.
'One who excels in warfare doesn't await the deployment of forces.'
Tai Kung's advice to King Wu, 11th Century B.C.
Acknowledgements:
Author thanks many for their valuable input and corrections although author
is solely responsible for the conclusions as well as all errors and
omissions.
Hamid Hussain
September 04, 2010
Defence Journal, September 2010
--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear
of punishment and hope of reward after death." --
Albert Einstein !!!
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/21952758/1971-India-Pakistan-War
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