From:
steinberg____XYZ@XYZ.comSubject: Middle East War Danger?
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2011 13:08:52 -0500
From a senior U.S. intelligence source on the unfolding crisis in Lebanon and the danger of an Israeli strike against Gaza, as promoted by The Economist and Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), I offer the following summary of my discussion.
1. The collapse of the Lebanese government over the pending Hariri tribunal indictments was expected. Syria and Saudi Arabia attempted to reach a compromise to hold the government together, but Hezbollah was opposed to any mention of Hezbollah in the UN report.
2. It is true that both Hezbollah and Hamas have boosted their missile and rocket capabilities, but it is not now expected that this will lead to an immediate war. This is despite The Economist and other European promotions of such an imminent war. There have been decisions by the leadership of both Hamas and Hezbollah to show restraint. Otherwise, Netanyahu would have siezed upon any excuse to attack southern Lebanon and/or Gaza, and he would have received widespread popular support in Israel for such action. The Gaza Hamas leadership is split, but a pragmatic faction that is opposed to any provocations of Israel is now dominant.
3. The top Hezbollah officials know that there is some chain of evidence, linking as many as five current Hezbollah leaders to the Hariri assassination. The level of evidence is uncertain. Some top Hezbollah officials, like Mustafa Badreddine (brother-in-law of Imad Mugniyah) may have provided "mechanical" assistance, but he and the other alleged Hezbollah officials were not on the scene for the bombing itself. Hezbollah is unhappy with Syria, based on the belief that Syria may have provided some corroborating information to the UN tribunal, to get themselves off the hook on the Hariri assassination. They may have pinpointed some of the Hezbollah personnel. So there is a degree of distrust between Hezbollah and Syria over this particular issue, despite otherwise continued close ties.
4. A war is always possible in the Middle East, because the region is always on the edge of war, but there is a majority among the Hamas leadership in Gaza, who are more concerned with running Gaza and propping up their military capabilities for the future, than they are with provoking Israel in the nearterm. They know that, despite the enhanced rocket and missile capabilities, the Israeli military can defeat them again. So a provocation of an Israeli attack on Gaza at this point is seen as counterproductive.
5. Hezbollah's leadership is confused about their strategic interests. They know there is a faction fight underway in Iran, which is a source of some uncertainty. There are differences within the Hezbollah leadership over how to deal with the Hariri government, and how to deal with Israel. This has caused some confusion and insecurity over their priorities. The problem is that whenever the Hezbollah leadership resorts to their instincts, they make errors and often they trigger wars. Nevertheless, Hezbollah is street smart, and they have the best understanding of the internal Lebanese situation, and the needs of their constituents. They are therefore always able to outplay Hariri and his backers, including the Saudis. The problem right now is that Hezbollah should have decided that there are a few people who are going to have to be coughed up and sacrificed to the Hariri commission. They should have made that decision before they walked out of the coalition government. The gamble they took, without having decided on who is to be sacrificed, was a wrong decision. Instability in this volatile climate can cause deeper instability. Hariri is not capable of handling this situation. He did wisely repair relations with Syria. Syria has a serious interest in building the relationship with Hariri, because it will only deepen their influence inside Lebanon, at a point when they have some frictional issues with Hezbollah.
6. The other important factor in the regional picture is the shaky Israeli government. This is an important factor. Israel is not getting what they think they need from the United States. They see the Hillary Clinton trip to the region as an appeasement of the Arabs, at the same time they believe the U.S. is not doing enough to deal with Iran. Apart from his successful sabotaging of the Israel-Palestine peace process, which has appeased his rightwing coalition partners, Bibi has not accomplished much else of anything. The Israeli institutions and the Israeli people do not see progress under Netanyahu. They are beginning to look critically upon the Netanyahu government. The economy is carrying a large segment of unproductive people, largely the ultra-orthodox, who insist on payoffs to keep in the government. Kadima and Labor are still popular and gaining in popularity. The Netanyahu government is far weaker than is perceived from the outside. This does not mean there is an imminent government crisis, but it does mean that, over the next 90 days, things could come to a head for the survival of Bibi. This creates a danger, because the rightwing has a motive to seek a pretext for a Gaza and/or Lebanon war to hold the regime in power. This is a factor of volatility in the situation. But overall, the assessment is that we are not on the verge of war, despite a heavy push by the Israeli rightwing for Bibi to order preemptive action. The reason that the war danger is somewhat diminished is that a majority pragmatic grouping within the leadership of both Hamas and Hezbollah do not intend to give Israel any pretext for an attack on either Gaza or southern Lebanon. It will become harder over the next 90 days for the Israeli institutions to justify the continuation of the Netanyahu government. This could lead to a collapse of the government, or some substantive peace concession by Bibi.
7. Hezbollah does not want another Lebanon war, and they know that the United States is not pressuring Hariri to disarm Hezbollah. So the status quo is about the best situation for the time being.
8. My source urged a careful reading of Hillary Clinton's recent speech in Doha, where she put pressure on the Arab governments to do more. She is, in fact, pursuing a balanced policy, pushing the Arab states for reform. The problem, as she understands it quite clearly, is that the Arab dictatorships and monarchies have successfully suppressed the secular reform opposition, so that the only credible opposition are the Islamists. At the same time, while there is improved security cooperation with the Saudis and other Persian Gulf Sunni regimes, the flow of money from the Gulf to fundamentalists in Pakistan and elsewhere, including the madrasas, is continuing with no sign of slowdown. One immediate consequence is that the US-Pakistan relationship is badly deteriorating. This represents a danger of permanent war which the U.S. institutions cannot allow. There is going to have to be a day of reckoning with the Saudis and the Pakistanis sometime very soon
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