London Wallpaper: Afghanistan-Endgame-Dr Hamid Hussain

Dear All;

A good friend based in Europe whose insight and knowledge about security
affairs I respect asked my two cent worth opinion about the end game in
Afghanistan and following was my response which may interest you.

Regards,

Hamid

Afghanistan – The Endgame

Hamid Hussain

'Victory in the true sense implies that the state of peace, and of one's
people, is better after the war than before.' Liddelhart

Conflict in Afghanistan is now three decades old with short periods of
relative calm and long periods of violent conflict among Afghans. The cast
of external actors changed with changing times while Afghan players used
external sources of patronage to secure, enhance and protect their own
interests. Afghanistan as a relatively peaceful country ensured stability
while efforts to radically change the state and society resulted in
fragmentation of the state. The waves of instability generated from
Afghanistan then had corrosive effects on many other nations.

Arrival of U.S. troops in the fall of 2001 to ouster Taliban regime was the
latest effort of radical change. Initial U.S. objective was very limited
and framed by the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Initial plan was
simply to overthrow Taliban regime and bring back the head of Osama bin
Ladin on a spike to satisfy a shocked and angry nation. Civilian and
military leadership was not thinking about any long term commitment. Then
Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld's motto was that 'we don't do nation
building'. When the year 2001 ended, one initial major objective was
achieved with less than 5'000 American boots on ground, total of 12 American
soldiers killed and an investment of only few million dollars. The 'mission
creep' started from trying to install a government with U.S. money and
protected by American bayonets followed by an ambitious plan of rebuilding
the whole country including army, police, education, healthcare and garbage
collection. There was little debate about the aims, resources needed for
such an enormous project as well as strategic patience for a long haul.

Prevailing thought process at Department of Defense was articulated by
Donald Rumsfeld when he stated in September 2003, "If you wanted to go build
a nation you're doing what the Soviet's did and kill 300,000 in a country
and smother it and try to take it over and build it, that's not what we're
about and I also do not believe that we are smart enough or wise enough to
know precisely what template ought to be fashioned and flopped down on
another group of people who have a different history, a different colored
cultured, a different geographic and strategic circumstance." (1) This
environment of ambiguity at the highest level coupled with absence of nuance
and finesse resulted in almost exclusive reliance on the money factor which
had a corrosive and corrupting influence on the whole strategy. The result
was a free for all bonanzas where Americans, Afghans and every body's cousin
looted American tax payer money to their heart's content.

A glance at the American investment so far and its returns can give an idea
of what went wrong. For the year 2001-2002, combat operations cost was
$20.8 billion. It started to escalate at a steady pace with $39.0 billion
in 2007, $43.5 billion in 2008 and $59.5 billion in 2009. In 2010, with
surge of troops, the cost almost doubled to $104.9 billion and projected
cost for 2011 is 119.4 billion. (2) There has been significant improvement
in many sectors in Afghanistan with better education and health facilities
and improvement of infrastructure of a war torn country. Peaceful areas of
northern and western Afghanistan have not reached European standards but
still they are far better than a decade ago looking at all parameters.
However, the amount of money spent does not correspond to the results. Main
reason is the fact that more than ninety percent of the cost is going
towards troop maintenance and combat operations. Security and corruption
eats large percentage of reconstruction money. Total of $336 billion has
been spent from the year 2001-2010 in Afghanistan with the end result that
everyone now agrees that the country is less secure than it was in 2002.
Winds of change are blowing in all directions and this means that all
players have to reevaluate their role. Convergence of several factors is
contributing towards this change.

'We got ourselves into this mess – we did not calculate it right and exposed
ourselves in all aspects. We weren't even able to use our military forces
appropriately. But now it's time to get out … We've got to get out of this
mess'. Mikhail Gorbachev, Politburo Session, 13 November, 1986 (3)

United States

'We went there absolutely not knowing the psychology of the people, or the
real situation in the country. And everything that we were and are doing in
Afghanistan is inconsistent with the moral face of our country'. Soviet
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Politburo Session, January 21, 1987
(4)

Arrival of U.S. troops in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 was due to the
tragic events of September 11. However, things have changed a lot in the
last nine years and many voices in U.S. are asking for serious reevaluation
of the whole project. U.S. is the dominant player in Afghanistan although
not in control of all the events. U.S. announced an overly ambitious plan
of overhauling a war torn country without taking into account the amount of
money, blood and time that is needed for such projects. Secondly, by direct
involvement in all affairs of the state of Afghanistan, U.S. gets entangled
in internal power struggles. Afghan players aligned with U.S. are using
American blood and treasure to serve their own interests. Domestic factors
in U.S. i.e. stagnant economy, high unemployment, midterm elections in
November 2010 and preparation for 2012 presidential elections will determine
what course Washington adopts in case of Afghanistan. The most likely short
term decision will be to give about twelve more months to see the results of
current military operations. On the military side, the focus will be on
thinning the senior and mid-level insurgent ranks by increased kinetic
operations which will invariably result in escalation of manned and unmanned
incursions in Pakistan's FATA area (probably limited to few miles inside the
Pakistani territory). On the parallel track of negotiations, incentives
will be increased to bring some Taliban as well as Hizb-e-Islami-Hikmatyar
(HIH) inside the tent. In the meantime, various government agencies will
be directed to prepare for alternatives such as re-deployment of forces, de
facto division of Afghanistan or subcontracting war to local and regional
state and non-state players.

The outcome of November 2010 midterm elections will have decisive impact on
the outcome of Afghan strategy review scheduled for December 2010. If
democrats loose significant number of seats in midterm elections, then
there will be more pressure on President Barrack Obama from his own side to
change the course in Afghanistan sooner rather than later. This will give
the supporters of 'Biden Option' an opening to push for their plan. Vice
President Joseph Biden and many on the left of political spectrum favor
marked reduction of military footprint in southern and eastern Afghanistan.
This plan envisages concentrating U.S. intelligence, special operations and
air assets (manned and unmanned) in Afghanistan to keep militants off
balance. (5) This option will invariably be coupled with arming local
militias in Pushtun areas to take on insurgents and taking war to the
badlands of Pakistan's tribal areas. Many argue that this will actually give
Washington more room for maneuverability and it will not be completely
beholden to both local Afghan as well regional players such as Pakistan.
This plan will markedly reduce vulnerability of U.S. troops as well as the
costs. However, it is just a detour and not a serious plan for the end
state. This is essentially putting the conflict on a different trajectory
by taking U.S. troops out of the gun sights and replacing them with locals.

At this stage, U.S. efforts are reminiscent of Soviet efforts of the past
and it seems Washington is following the advice that Soviet Prime Minister
Nikolai Rhyzhov gave to Politburo in January 1987 regarding Afghanistan. He
said, 'It would be better for us to give them weapons, ammunition. And let
them fight on their own, if they want. And in parallel to actively lead the
{process of} political reconciliation'. (6) In 2009, limited efforts were
started to recruit local tribesmen for protection of roads and public
buildings in Afghanistan. This project was initiated in eighteen eastern,
southern and western provinces. (7) Currently, empowerment of local Afghan
armed groups is on a small scale. Village Stability Program run by Special
Forces is operating in some communities. If General David Petraeus gets his
way (President Karzai is resisting this approach) then we will see expansion
of this effort on a larger scale. (8) The hope is that arming village
communities to protect themselves while speeding up the training of Afghan
forces will provide enough room for U.S. troops to pullback. This will meet
at least the political requirement in Washington as it will be crucial for
President Obama to actually manage a partial withdrawal (at least two combat
brigades) before going in for his re-election campaign in 2012.

One key factor of extreme unpopularity of U.S. in the region and in the
broader Muslim world is frequently overlooked by key decision makers as well
as otherwise very informative and in depth studies and analyses. Average
American has no direct connection with these far off lands while those who
travel to these areas are severely restricted in their interactions. As far
as diplomats and spooks are concerned, they get some meaningful and useful
information. However living in fortresses among a sea of extremely hostile
populations and relying on their local contacts as well as 'cocktail gossip'
has its own limitations. Local players have their own agenda and many a
times they use American influence towards their own ends. Even U.S.
allies in Muslim world see Washington as part of the problem.

In the background of many genuine and perceived grievances among the general
population as well as ruling elite about U.S. policies towards their
societies, it is naïve to expect that simply throwing some aid money will
make the problem go away. Extreme negative opinion about U.S. hinders every
aspect of U.S. policy. This anti-Americanism does not mean that general
population embraces extremism. In fact, majority abhor extremism among their
midst but a good number see this menace as a direct result of aggressive and
militaristic U.S. posture and direct presence of foreign troops in Muslim
lands. (9)

A strategic U.S. pull back is essential both to cool passions and anger in
the Muslim world including Pakistan as well as putting the house in order
back in U.S. This does not mean that U.S. will disengage from Afghanistan
completely or quickly. Threat of extremism from the region is clear and
present; however the approach needs to be changed. There was always a
debate about whether the problem of extremism is military or law
enforcement. After a decade of military approach, it is likely that those
who advocate law enforcement approach may get their voices heard in this
ongoing debate. Military pullback will provide more room for diplomatic,
intelligence and law enforcement cooperation with countries crucial for
tackling extremism.

'Adjust your ends to your means.' Liddelhart

Afghans

'Americans have long known that Afghan commanders and regional leaders are
incorrigibly fractious, unpredictable, uncompromising, and power obsessed'.
A Pakistani official to U.S. delegation, Islamabad, August 28, 2001 (10)

In all the discussions and studies about Afghanistan, one aspect that is
missing is Afghans. I have not seen any serious work that looks at what
games Afghan power brokers are playing. Whenever Afghans are mentioned,
they are seen as black and white. They are either vilified or eulogized
depending on which side is describing Afghans. The narrative portrays
Afghan as insurgent or extremist busy killing and destroying or cooperating
with U.S. to try to put back the broken humpty dumpty of Afghanistan. The
reality is much more complex where Afghan power brokers playing their
centuries old skills of using one party against the other to extract maximum
benefits. (11) General population usually stays neutral in such
circumstances while power brokers run their own shows. There are very few
Afghan players who are thinking in modern nation state terms when talking
about the future of Afghanistan. Each ethnic, regional, tribal and
sectarian community is working to extract maximum benefits for its narrow
support base.

In 2010, the situation is very much like late 1988 when Soviet Union
announced that it will be leaving Afghanistan. The ambitions of Afghan
players need to be seen in the historical context. The speed with which
Afghan power players make and then break any alliance is truly breathtaking
and mind boggling for the outsider. This is the main skill used to survive
in a tough neighborhood.

A glimpse of these byzantine intrigues is provided by actions of Afghans in
the last one year. When Afghan President Hamid Karzai got furious with
Pakistan, he went to India to fulminate against Pakistan. When India tried
to diversify its own Afghan portfolio and started high level contacts with
Karzai's rival Abdullah Abdullah, Karzai went to Islamabad to show his
displeasure. When Washington demanded that Karzai clean his own stables and
rampant corruption of his cronies, he retaliated by removing two key Afghan
officials (Interior Minister Hanif Atmar and Chief of Afghan intelligence
Amrullah Saleh) cooperating with Americans in these corruption
investigations. When frustrated Washington snubbed Karzai by cancelling his
U.S. visit, Karzai invited Washington's nemesis Iranian President
Ahmadinejad to Kabul. (12) In the next move, President Hamid Karzai will
try to bring in as many Pushtun groups as possible on his side for the next
cycle of power struggle. Current negotiations with Taliban and HIH should
be seen in this context. Two groups of Pushtuns; hardliner Taliban and
Karzai's local rivals in the southern part especially Gul Agha Sherzoi will
be the spoilers in this game. He will try first to negotiate a deal with
insurgents independent of Pakistan. However, Pakistan will likely thwart
these efforts and in the end, to achieve his goals, Karzai will have no
choice but to get back on the Pakistan wagon or risk a direct conflict with
Pakistan. In the inner battles, another wild card is Defence Minister Abdur
Rahim Wardak. He is quietly strengthening his position in case replacement
of Karzai becomes a serious consideration in Washington. His son Hamid
Wardak; a Georgetown University graduate handles the business and public
relations front especially in Washington. (13)

Non-Pushtuns in general are in no mood for another round of Pushtun
hegemony; no matter in what shape or form. Their hatred for Taliban brand
of hegemony is well ingrained now in younger generation and they will fight
to a bitter end to stop this outcome. Non-Pushtun leaders are already
touring their respective areas warning their flocks about the looming danger
as negotiations with Taliban are getting under way. The political and
military resistance will be localized with the real possibility of
resurrection of old and emergence of new warlords in northern, central and
western Afghanistan. They will drift back towards their former supporters
including Iran, Russia, Central Asian Republics (CARs) and India. The only
difference this time will be that if U. S. decides on pulling back from
eastern and southern Afghanistan, then it will be relying more on
non-Pushtuns. If the next round of violence crosses a certain threshold
then the first step will be fracture of fledgling Afghan army along ethnic
lines. The northern, central and western Afghanistan may come under a loose
alliance on the lines of old Northern Alliance. This will be the start of
the road for another round of civil war or de facto partition of the
country.

Opposition to Afghan government and U.S. troops is not monolithic and these
players are also now positioning themselves for coming changes. Taliban is
a generic term used for a number of groups operating in Afghanistan. Some
Taliban fighting on the platform of removal of foreign forces also want to
position themselves for the power struggle after U.S. pull back. This is
the group most likely to participate in negotiations. Their aim will be to
get some levers of state power to strengthen their ranks for the next round
as well as preventing the take over of leadership by more extreme Taliban
groups. However, they will also go with their own 'surge' to extract
maximum in the negotiations. They will increase operations not only in the
south but will try to engage international and Afghan troops in the east and
start significant operations in northern Pushtun settlement pockets where
coalition troops are thinly spread. Focus will be mainly on line of
communications and bombings.

In 2008-09, small numbers of Taliban started to trickle back n northern
Pushtun settlements and gradually increased control of local Pushtun
communities. (14) Taliban groups organizing and operating in Pushtun
settlements in the north are coming in direct conflict with Hizb-e-Islami-
Hikmatyar (HIH) group. The battle lines are already being drawn in the
Pushtun settlement communities in north. HIH has strong influence in these
northern communities especially in Konduz. When Taliban started to make
inroads in these Pushtun communities, HIH was alarmed. NATO troops deployed
in these areas were focused on reconstruction and were not in fighting
business. Arrival of U.S. troops gave HIH an opportunity to use U.S.
firepower and purse to diminish Taliban influence. No one should be
surprised if good actionable intelligence against Taliban in these areas
start coming from HIH cadres. Afghan Taliban groups who genuinely believe
in their own puritan version of governance based on Sharia and those closely
allied with foreign militants entrenched in Pakistan's tribal areas will
likely take extreme positions but will directly confront other power holders
more late in the game. Their best chance to expand their influence will be
when internal power struggle among other Afghan groups becomes violent with
significant deterioration of overall security. The conflict between
Afghanistan based Taliban and Pakistan sponsored Taliban will also be later
in the game when these groups are able to hold large swaths of territory and
start to administer them openly.

Everyone is hailing the negotiations track and it is an important step,
however it should be seen in Afghan historical context. There should be no
illusion about the power games. In the previous civil war, deeply religious
and conservative Afghan leaders were literally pushed inside the Kaba; the
holiest place of Islam where they signed on the holy book Quran and promised
to work together and avoid violence. The moment they landed back in
Afghanistan, they engaged in such a horrific cycle of violence that citizens
of Kabul looked at the days of Soviet occupation with nostalgia. If anyone
thinks that Afghans will adhere to any deal signed under the shadow of star
spangled banner is either naïve or smoking the stuff that is now the major
export of Afghanistan. Afghans will play by the rules of Afghan game which
will look more like Buzkushi rather than baseball. Unfortunately, the next
act of this play will most likely be another cycle of violence and that also
of local flavor (in the not too distant cycle of civil war, wholesale
slaughter of opponents was the norm rather than exception). Afghans tend to
blame outsiders for all their woes but ignore the fact that it was their own
kin that decided to carry the rifles of strangers to kill their own
countrymen rather than working for an inclusive political solution.

The best thing for the war ravaged proud people of Afghanistan will be some
kind of power sharing arrangement among Afghan centers of power and ethnic
communities so that ordinary citizen can rebuild his life. Current
relatively balanced structure of government can be used as a platform on
which an inclusive and participatory system based on tolerance and respect
can be expanded. A reasonably stable and responsible government is
functional enough to allow basic economic activity. Along with this,
transition from U.S. troops to troops from neutral countries under a new UN
mandate over twelve to twenty four months period should be the next step.
UN troops then maintain security and provide training of Afghan forces with
the hope that over next six to eight years, Afghan central government is
able to provide minimum security to its citizens. Afghan project will need
international support but it is better to spend on reconstruction rather
than destruction. Violence will be there but if it is kept below a certain
threshold then it will be a blessing for Afghans and their neighbors.

'This is Afghanistan. We cannot get on here without practicing deceit'.
Yakub Khan to Louis Cavagnari 1879 (15)

Pakistan

'Pakistan is in a tight spot; If GOP pressure on the Taliban succeeds,
critics say it proves the GOP has leverage; If GOP pressure fails, critics
complain that Pakistan opted not to use its leverage'. A Pakistani official
to U.S. delegation, Islamabad, August 28, 2001 (16)

Pakistan is the only country that has to benefit the most from a relatively
peaceful and stable Afghanistan and also the country that will suffer the
most from the next round of violence. Surely, Pakistani military leadership
is responsible for many acts of omission and commission as far Afghanistan
is concerned and Pakistani state and society is experiencing the horrific
fallout from that policy. However, Pakistan is not responsible for
everything. Every one has contributed its fair share to Afghanistan mess.
Pakistani generals are also not naive and know the consequences of these
dangerous games but are either unwilling to unable to change the course.
Then Director General of Inter Services Intelligence (DGISI) Lieutenant
General Mahmud Ahmad told U.S. ambassador Wendy Chamberlain on September 23,
2001 that 'we will not flinch from a military effort, but a strike will
produce thousands of frustrated young Muslim men. It will be an incubator
of anger that will explode two or three years from now'. (17) That
explosion is now proving to be a serious hazard to Pakistan's health.
Pakistan's initial cooperation with U.S. in Afghanistan in the aftermath of
September 11 was in a totally changed strategic environment. For the first
time, Pakistani military leadership really felt that if they don't cooperate
with U.S. the rug will be pulled and they wisely chose to get out of the gun
sights of Washington. However, since that time period things have changed
dramatically both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Instability of Afghanistan
has rolled right across the Durand Line with horrific consequences for
Pakistan.

Pakistan is now working on the post-U.S. scenario in Afghanistan. Fearful
of losing everything in Afghanistan, Pakistan is desperately trying to
collect its own Afghan horses for the race. In this effort, the gulf
between Islamabad and Washington is widening at a rapid pace. In the
background of long standing mutual suspicion and frustration, each party is
blaming others for its own failures. Washington blaming Pakistanis for not
doing enough especially not draining the swamp in North Waziristan and
Pakistan blaming Washington for not paying any attention to Pakistan's
interests in Afghanistan and making their job difficult by trying to shove
U.S. personnel in Pakistan's face and rapidly escalating drone strikes.

Lack of public support for any project of cooperation with U.S. means that
Pakistani government and military has to tread the path very carefully. So
far, Pakistan army kept the balance by cooperating to the extent where one
or two drone attacks every few weeks was considered manageable to keep the
lid on public relations problem as well as ripples inside the military
ranks. The friction worsened recently with attack of NATO helicopters on a
Pakistani post killing three soldiers and rapid escalation of drone attacks.
This was coupled with selective leaks from U.S. officials to the media about
Pakistan's naughtiness. In retaliation, Pakistan closed the border for NATO
supply trucks. It was quite clear to even a casual observer that supply
route is an ace card in Pakistan army's hand, however it was expected not be
shown in the game. The fact that military brass has actually used this card
by closing the road shows extreme frustration and anger of the senior brass.

U.S. military operating in Afghanistan is convinced that to achieve limited
military objectives inside Afghanistan, they need to take into consideration
Pakistan based militants. This means increased operations on Pakistani side
of the border, angering Pakistanis and severe strain on bilateral relations.
U.S. intelligence community deeply worried about wide array of extremists
from different countries entrenched in FATA dramatically escalated the
'drone war'. The anger and frustration building in U.S. against Pakistan
will play out in a year or two. Extreme negative opinion among general
public and Congress will make continuation of military and economic aid very
difficult for any administration. The third ongoing round of wide ranging
dialogue between senior Pakistani and U.S. officials in Washington is not
likely to be a pleasant one for either party. There are two schools of
thought in the U.S. strategic community. One that considers Pakistan as
part of the solution and the other considers Pakistan as part of the
problem. If later group gets an upper hand in the next round of strategic
shift, then Washington may decide to call the Pakistan army bluff and that
is when things can get very ugly. In that case, Washington will slow down
the money and equipment pipeline to tighten the screws on Pakistani
generals. This will be paralleled with bypassing Pakistan government and
opening a direct channel and serious discussions with groups inside Pakistan
i.e. ethnic, tribal and sectarian.

On Pakistani side, in the background of extremely negative public opinion
about U.S. and rising anger over rapid escalation of drones attacks, it is
very difficult for any government as well as military leadership to be seen
working openly with U.S. Pakistan army is already deployed frontally in
large swaths of the country and military leadership is genuinely concerned
about overstretch. Recent devastating floods and destruction of
infrastructure makes logistical support of several divisions deployed in the
periphery of the state a nightmare task. Pakistani military brass is
fearful that in such circumstances it is not wise to open a new front in
North Waziristan. They want to do it on their own timeline but
unfortunately Islamabad and Washington time zones are poles apart. The
problem of Pakistan army is that if decides on the operation, its own people
accuse it of acting for U.S. rather than its own interests. If it does not
act, then it faces the ire of Washington. They are trying to walk a fine
line and in the process getting hammered by both sides.

Everyone acknowledges Pakistan's genuine security interests in Afghanistan,
however many including informed Pakistanis disagree with the approach taken
by Pakistani military. Military as an institution follows the path directed
by higher brass but officer corps is not monolithic. Some are of the view
that domestic extremism has replaced India as major threat while others
still adhere to the India centric themes and see everything through Indian
prism. Some see the presence of 'free lance militants' as a serious threat
to Pakistan especially in the context of horrific violence unleashed on
Pakistani society. However, there are others who still think that some of
these 'loose canons' can still be meaningfully employed especially to secure
Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan obsessed with India is again
repeating the same mistake in Afghanistan by taking sides in a civil war.
In the process, it is earning the hostility of a number of Afghans and they
will surely pay Pakistan in the same coin in due time. Many Afghans have
sworn this time that if the neighbors don't mend their ways, they will send
the demons of chaos right back across the border (referring to Pakistan and
Iran). (18)

It looks that Pakistan has doubled the wages on Afghan gambling table.
There is a general impression among army officers that U.S. has already lost
Afghanistan and on its way out. They assume that Afghan groups sympathetic
to Pakistan will prevail in the next round. While the first part may be
true but the second part of this assumption is highly dubious. This is a
very dangerous assumption and reminiscent of short sighted policy of 1989.
Pakistan needs to take into consideration ground realities in Afghanistan.
It may have some proxies but there are significant negative feelings about
Pakistan among Afghans of all ethnicities. ABC/BBC poll done in 2009 gives
some insight into these feelings. Only 1% of Afghans considered Pakistan
very favorable while 65% ranked it very unfavorable. 86% Afghans were of
the view that Pakistan was having negative influence on Afghanistan while
only 5% considered positive influence of Pakistan. (19) In addition, many
other powerful regional and international players on Afghan scene will
resist Pakistan's efforts. Pakistani brass is again ignoring the basic fact
of what others can do? In the aftermath of disastrous assault on Jalalabad
in 1989, someone asked then Afghan President Najibullah about why Pakistan's
efforts failed? A smiling Najibullah replied, 'they had a great plan but
they forgot a small detail. They never thought about what we will do?'
(20) The stakes for Pakistan are much higher in 2011 compared to 1989.

Pakistan is insisting that only those 'good Taliban' escorted by ISI should
be given a seat at the negotiating table. Islamabad is tightening the
screws on those Taliban who are negotiating independently with Karzai.
Washington and Kabul suspicious of Islamabad are trying their best to make a
deal with some insurgents independent of Pakistan while fully aware that
Pakistan can hinder these efforts. As far as Pakistan is concerned, keeping
channels open with all Afghan players is one thing but juggling with
'grenades' is a serious business. Pakistan has genuine expectation that
Afghanistan should not be used against its interests, however the follies of
the past clearly show that trying to install proxies to achieve this goal
ended not only in dismal failure but has actually worsened Pakistan's
security situation. The best thing for Pakistan is to keep channels open
with all Afghans and encouraging them to work in a broad based government.
If Afghans decide to go for another round of violence, Pakistan's efforts
should be focused on how to prevent this fire from crossing the Durand Line.
Taking sides in favor of one party at the expense of the other will surely
backfire with serious negative fallout for Pakistan's security. Pakistan is
suffering from the effects of it's polices in the previous cycle of civil
war in Afghanistan and if it repeats the same mistake, the consequences for
Pakistani state and society will be horrific.

Many Pakistani officers now admit that use of non-state actors for national
security policy was a disastrous decision. None other than former army
chief General Pervez Mussharraf recently stated that 'we poisoned Pakistani
civil society for 10 years when we fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the
1980s'. (21) If Pakistan insists on direct meddling in Afghanistan's
affairs then they should also be ready for the inevitable fallout of such
myopic policies. Last few years have shown extreme vulnerability of
Pakistan on several fronts including unresolved serious economic and
political issues, complete alienation of Baluchistan, violence in FATA and
terrorism in major urban cities. Very little effort and investment can
literally unravel the state of Pakistan.

The national security decision makers of Pakistan should remember that their
primary task is to secure Pakistan and provide security to Pakistanis. All
resources should be geared towards peace and stability of Pakistan. The
first step towards right direction is introspection and dispassionate
analysis of policies adopted in the past as well rational analysis of
potential benefits as well as consequences of current polices. In the
absence of that there is serious risk that senior military leaders of
Pakistan may put everything on the gambling table of Afghanistan including
the very survival of the state as well as its 'crown jewels'. It is
important that there is an informed debate in parliament as well in media
about country's Afghan policy.

The most desirable outcome for Pakistan is a reasonably stable and
functional government in neighboring Afghanistan no matter of what
ideological or political inclination. Pakistan's major threat is now
internal and even if Afghanistan becomes Switzerland, it will not solve
Pakistan's problems. Pakistan should encourage all Afghan power brokers
towards a negotiated settlement and in return expect a neutral even if not a
friendly Afghanistan. Pakistani decision makers should try their best from
getting sucked into the vacuum in the aftermath of foreign troop withdrawal
from Afghanistan. A stable and peaceful Afghanistan is blessing for
Pakistan and a cooperative and friendly relationship will help in security
and economic sectors improving life of ordinary Pakistanis and Afghans.

'Once the dust settles in Afghanistan, it is the Pakistanis who will live
with the results, long after other coalition partners have returned home'.
U.S. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlain, November 30, 2001 (22)

Iran

'Your rifle is not loaded, but that's not what my heart tells me'. A
Kurdish proverb

Iran's strategic environment changed dramatically when two hostile
governments at Iran's borders; Afghanistan and Iraq were removed by U.S.
military intervention in 2001 and 2003. One kind of threat was replaced by
another as presence of U.S. troops in two countries bordering Iran in the
background of poor relations between two countries gave many sleepless
nights to Iranian leaders. In both cases, Tehran followed a policy where it
worked with U.S. installed governments in Baghdad and Kabul and channeled
financial support to its favorites and helped them to extract maximum
concessions in internal struggles. At the same time, it provided enough
money and weapons and in discrete enough way to make sure that there was
enough heat on U.S. troops.

Iran is in a conundrum where it is fearful of re-emergence of extreme Sunni
power base near its border in Afghanistan while at the same time
uncomfortable with long term entrenchment of U.S. forces sitting on its
borders. Tehran will be very happy with an Iraq like outcome where major
U.S. forces depart leaving behind a government that is not hostile to
Tehran. Tehran supports non-Pushtun allies in Afghanistan as well as its
only Pushtun horse of dubious past; Gulbadin Hikmatyar. Hikmatyar spent
several years in Tehran after Pakistan dumped him in favor of Taliban. In
addition, there have been allegations of supply of weapons by Tehran to
groups fighting U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Ayatollahs are smart enough to
keep their Afghan portfolio diversified.

Iran is the only country that is worried about the negotiations with
Taliban. Tehran feels that increased power to Taliban means drastic
reduction in influence of its own favorites mainly non-Pushtun factions.
Iranian and Indian interests converge in Afghanistan in this context. Iran
has increased its cooperation with India in Afghanistan and both countries
are working on joint projects in Afghanistan including development of
Chahbahar port in Iran and construction of Zaranj-Dilaram road in
Afghanistan and ambitious project of Chahbahar-Iranshahar-Zahedan railway on
to Milak in Afghanistan. These efforts are geared towards developing
alternative routes of doing business with Afghanistan and Central Asia and
as an instrument of 'soft power' in Afghanistan.

Iranian leadership is pragmatic and despite serious disputes with U.S. and
public hostile posture, they focus on securing their own interest. In 2001,
Iranians cooperated with U.S. on the sidelines in removal of Taliban and
installation of new government. Tehran may be again willing to work with
Washington to secure its interests in Afghanistan replicating similar
efforts in Iraq. In August 2010, German representative to Afghanistan
Michael Steiner visited Tehran to prepare the ground for getting Iran on
board. (23) In October 2010, Iran participated in high level meetings in
Rome with U.S., NATO, UN, European Union (EU) and Afghan officials.
Tehran's representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Mohammad Ali Qanezadeh
led Iranian delegation in these talks. (24)

If Iran tries to repeat its mistakes of the past by using its Afghan proxies
in Afghan civil war as well as Shia-Sunni rivalry then it will also suffer
from the consequences. It will bring in Saudi Arabia as well as Pakistan on
the opposite side. In addition, destabilized Afghanistan will be used by
those hostile to Tehran to stir trouble. Alienation in Sistan-Baluchistan
province of Iran can be used to create a bad headache for Tehran.

Working relations with all players despite differences may help in
preventing more problems in Afghanistan. If both Tehran and Washington show
restraint, cool down rhetoric and focus on common interest of stability of
Afghanistan, it will pay dividend in the long run to both countries.
Conciliatory tone in both countries on this issue and Washington's move to
separate talks with Tehran on Afghanistan from other explosive issues
especially Iran's nuclear program are a step in right direction. A stable
and peaceful Afghanistan is in Tehran's best interest and it has the
potential of integrating Iran's economy with Central Asia. This is a
win-win game for all players. The best outcome will be where regional
players including Iran compete in economic activity and reconstruction of
the region rather than fighting proxy wars.

Saudi Arabia

'A foolish man may be known by six things: Anger without cause, speech
without profit, change without progress, inquiry without object, putting
trust in a stranger, and mistaking foes for friends'. An Arab proverb

In 1980s, Saudi Arabia provided money and arranged for some Arab foot
soldiers for Afghan war in cooperation with Pakistan. When U.S. disengaged
from Afghanistan in 1990s, Saudi influence increased as they were writing
the checks. Saudi Arabia got the rude awakening when the demons nurtured in
Afghanistan came back home turning their guns on royal family.

Now Saudi Arabia needs to keep an eye on the region and increase liaison
with Pakistani intelligence to make sure that no demon sneak back into the
kingdom. Saudi Arabia hosted participants of Afghan negotiations and
brought some Taliban to the table. However, they insist on one condition
that Taliban cut ties with Al-Qaeda that just recently again announced its
intention to strike at royal family.

Saudi Arabia initially supported Afghans against Soviet occupation but later
got entangled in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan in the context of old
Arab-Persian and Sunni-Shia sectarian war in competition with Iran. Iran
and Saudi Arabia are equally guilty of engaging in a fratricidal war in
Pakistan and Afghanistan. One hopes that both Riyadh and Tehran have
learned their lessons seeing the tragic consequences in their own lands
where suicide bombers have targeted government officials and ordinary
citizens. Tehran and Riyadh are poles apart on several issues but keeping
channels open to avoid misunderstanding and working together on issues of
mutual interests such as stability of Afghanistan and cooperation against
extremist threat will benefit both countries. A constructive and positive
contribution of Saudi Arabia towards negotiations in Afghanistan will
benefit the kingdom in the long run.

India

'The Indians think that we should not withdraw our troops completely, or in
any case, to "move fast without rushing".' Mikhail Gorbachev in Politburo
Session, January 21, 1987 (25)

India traditionally had good relations with Afghanistan. With the emergence
of Taliban, India lost everything in Afghanistan. It continued to support
Northern Alliance with the help of Iran and CARs but its impact was limited.
Afghanistan became India's national security problem in the context of
relationship of militants operating in Indian controlled Kashmir with
Afghan and Pakistani militants. In the aftermath of arrival of U.S. troops,
India's old Afghan friends of Northern Alliance got important posts in
government. Cooperation between newly reconstituted Afghan intelligence;
National Security Directorate (NSD) and Indian intelligence (especially
Research and Analysis Wing assigned with external intelligence task)
improved over the years due to common threat perception from militants.
India's focus so far has been on 'soft power' mainly engaging in
reconstructing projects and training of Afghans in India. Currently, there
are about 4000 Indian workers in Afghanistan. After attacks on India
workers, India sent a contingent of Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) to
guard Indian workers and facilities in Afghanistan and current number of
ITBP is about 500. (26)

Increased Indian activities in Afghanistan rattled Pakistanis and they
complained that Indians were working with Baluch separatists to destabilize
Baluchistan province. India accused Pakistani intelligence of supporting
and encouraging insurgents to attack Indian targets in Afghanistan. India
publicly accused ISI of orchestrating the attack on Indian embassy in Kabul
in July 2008 that killed Indian Defence Attaché Brigadier Ravi Dutt Mehta.
Pakistani military conveyed its own misgivings repeatedly and forcefully to
Washington and American policy makers now had to take into consideration
Pakistan's concerns. This was the main reason that Washington informed
India to limit its engagement in Afghanistan to reconstruction projects. By
2009, this factor was important enough that U.S. commander in Afghanistan
General Stanley McChrystal reported in his assessment that, 'While Indian
activities largely benefit the Afghan people; increasing Indian influence in
Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage
Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India'. (27) In view of
decade's old animosity between the two countries and shifting sands, there
is a clear and present danger of escalation of proxy war between India and
Pakistan on Afghan ground. (28)

There is a risk of serious miscalculation by both sides. If Pakistan
encourages more violence against Indian interests in Afghanistan then it is
very likely that hawks in Indian security establishment advocating a more
aggressive posture may get an upper hand. This will result in increase in
numbers of Indian paramilitary troops to guard Indian workers as well as
intelligence assets. The argument for this policy will be that it is better
to fight militancy in Afghanistan rather than on Indian soil as many
militant organizations engaged in Kashmir against Indian forces have links
with groups based in Pakistan's tribal areas as well as Afghanistan. On the
other hand, if India takes some provocative actions regarding Baluchistan,
then a startled Pakistani military brass may target Indian interests in
Afghanistan.

India's main interest in Afghanistan is to make sure that the soil of
Afghanistan is not used against its interests. The same is true in case of
Pakistan. Understanding between India and Pakistan of not using Afghanistan
against the other should be the first step towards right direction. Both
countries have suffered from self inflicted wounds and every effort should
be made by both sides to avoid a proxy war in Afghanistan. Engagement of
diplomatic, military and intelligence communities of both countries and
frank discussion about mutual fears and interests and an informed debate in
their societies may have some restraining influence. It is an open secret
that both countries are running robust intelligence gathering operations in
Afghanistan however it is crucial for national security decision makers of
both countries to show extreme restraint.

The most desirable outcome will be to bind economic interests of the two
countries in projects involving CARs, Afghanistan, Iran, India and Pakistan.
The hope will be that if both countries make more money by cooperation, they
will be less inclined to pull the gun at the slightest provocation. For a
change, may be the leaders of both countries can try competition in
reconstruction rather than destruction in Afghanistan and involvement in
economic and energy projects beneficial to the people of both India and
Pakistan.

"The consequences of that vacuum where Pakistan stepped in and meddled were
horrendous for India. It's a lesson no one in India is in the mood to learn
again." Harsh Pant, professor of defense studies at King's College London.
(29)

Central Asian Republics (CARs)

'Whatever you put in your pot comes to your spoon'. A Turkmen proverb

Main fear of all CARS is extremism and violence coming to their lands from
the Afghan gate. Three CARs; Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan share
border with Afghanistan. CARS Afghan dilemma is complicated by conflicting
pressures from Washington and Moscow, ethnic kin in Afghanistan and links of
domestic violent opposition with militant groups based in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Turkmenistan policy has been positive neutrality and working with
any group that comes to power in Afghanistan. It has paid dividends and
Turkmenistan has been able to avoid serious fallout. Main advantage of
Turkmenistan is that its ethnic kin are very small in number in Afghanistan
and country does not have a serious armed opposition that can use unstable
Afghanistan as safe haven.

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are not as lucky as Turkmenistan. There is a
significant Tajik presence in Afghanistan and a civil war in Tajikistan in
early 1990s embroiled Afghan elements in it. Uzbekistan supported fellow
Uzbeks in Afghanistan and Uzbek opposition most notably Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) used Afghan territory to fight government of Uzbekistan.
In addition to these domestic and regional factors, CARs have to walk a fine
line to avoid antagonizing powerful players especially U.S. and Russia.
U.S. has been pushing CARs for more access for bases and transit facilities
for its Afghan operation while Russia uses economic and diplomatic levers to
prevent entrenchment of U.S. outposts in its backyard.

The most desirable outcome for CARs is a stable and peaceful Afghanistan
that can act as a corridor for trade to outside world. This will benefit
all regional economies and improve condition of local populations. A
reasonable and stable Afghan government will likely not allow opposition
groups from CARs to operate from its territory.

Conclusion

'There is tiredness of Afghanistan everywhere – in Afghanistan itself, and
in Pakistan, and in our country, and in the entire world'. Mikhail
Gorbachev, January 21, 1987 (30)

Every country wants to secure its own narrow interests in Afghanistan and
each country is hedging its bets as well as funding its Afghan proxies. In
any national security decision making process, one cannot simply look at the
credit side of the ledger and totally ignore the debit side. For every
future gain there is also possibility of some serious fall out for national
security. Continued presence of large number of American troops as well as
large scale kinetic operations will continue to inflame passions not only in
eastern and southern Afghanistan but also among Muslims worldwide. This
aspect is often neglected in discussion about the cost of war. Presence of
U.S. troops in Iraq was like adding fuel to the fire of extremism in Muslim
countries and departure of troops from that theatre has significantly
reduced the anger. Afghan theatre was not as violent in the early stages
therefore its impact was not significant compared to Iraq. However, now
with increasing violence and especially rapid escalation of extremism in
neighboring Pakistan as well as threat of domestic violence from inflamed
passions of American Muslims should be a reason for strategic pull back.
Then Secretary of State Collin Powell correctly diagnosed the problem few
years ago and said that 'folks are tired of getting slapped around by the
United States. They've stopped listening'. (31)

Frontal deployment of U.S. troops in Muslim countries is one of the major
factors aggravating the situation. It was presence of U.S. troops in Saudi
Arabia long after the end of hostilities that was used as recruiting poster
by militant groups all over the Muslim world. Attack on Iraq infuriated
Muslims all over the world with devastating consequences for several
countries. Now a responsible transition in Afghanistan and withdrawal of
U.S. troops is the next logical step. Parallel to planning for an endgame
in Afghanistan with gradual pull back of troops, focus on close cooperation
between intelligence and law enforcement agencies of regional countries will
likely improve security than kinetic military operations.

Conflict does not follow a predetermined or desired pattern. It is a
dynamic process that evolves with time and strategies to tackle it also
evolve. Every action generates new ground realities. The most desired way
forward is cooperation among all Afghan and regional countries to work
together towards stability of Afghanistan. This should be coupled with a
framework for withdrawal of American troops over twelve to twenty four
months time period. A new U.N. mandate with troops from neutral countries
can be used in the transition period where Afghan national army is strong
enough to support a central government. Afghans can then decide among
themselves whether to live together in peace, fight another round with each
other or separate. Informed debate among populations of all involved
countries demanding peace, stability and economic progress and encouraging
people to people contact to understand each other better can be a much solid
foundation for peace and progress. Public pressure from their own informed
citizens can have some restraining effect on all governments. More
transparency in higher decision making process and public debate regarding
various options about ending the conflict can pay much rich dividends in the
long run. Genuine efforts by all players and active engagement of civil
societies for the better and peaceful future are an effort worth taking.

'A real friend is one who takes the hand of his friend in times of distress
and helplessness.' An Afghan proverb

Acknowledgement: Author thanks many for their valuable input although
conclusions as well as all errors and omissions are author's sole
responsibility. Special thanks to Saifullah Ahmadzai; an Afghanistan based
independent analyst for his insightful information about regional players.

Notes:

1- Donald Rumsfeld, September 08, 2003, (
<http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3144>
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3144

2- Amy Belasco. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror
Operations since 9/11. September 2, 2010. Congressional Research Service. (
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf>
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf

3-
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB272/Doc%205%201986-11-13%20Politb
uro%20on%20Afghanistan.pdf>
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB272/Doc%205%201986-11-13%20Politbu
ro%20on%20Afghanistan.pdf

4-
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB272/Doc%206%201987-01-21%20Politb
uro%20Session%20Afghan.pdf>
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB272/Doc%206%201987-01-21%20Politbu
ro%20Session%20Afghan.pdf

5- <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/asia/23policy.html>
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/asia/23policy.html and
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/14/world/14biden.html>
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/14/world/14biden.html

6-
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB272/Doc%206%201987-01-21%20Politb
uro%20Session%20Afghan.pdf>
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB272/Doc%206%201987-01-21%20Politbu
ro%20Session%20Afghan.pdf

7- <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124994313594220571.html>
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124994313594220571.html

8-
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/09/AR201007090
5599.html>
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/09/AR2010070905
599.html

9- This conclusion is based on author's interviews with a number of Muslims
from different backgrounds including Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, India,
Indonesia, Turkey, Arabs and Kurds over the last few years.

10- <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB325/doc03.pdf>
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB325/doc03.pdf

11- For details of some of these intrigues see Mathieu Aikins. India in
Afghanistan. The Caravan, October 2010
<http://www.caravanmagazine.in/Story.aspx?Storyid=514&StoryStyle=FullStory>
http://www.caravanmagazine.in/Story.aspx?Storyid=514&StoryStyle=FullStory

12-
<http://www.caravanmagazine.in/Story.aspx?Storyid=514&StoryStyle=FullStory>
http://www.caravanmagazine.in/Story.aspx?Storyid=514&StoryStyle=FullStory

13- <http://www.thenation.com/article/afghan-lobby-scam>
http://www.thenation.com/article/afghan-lobby-scam

14-
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/08/28/74543/talibans-growth-in-afghanistans.
html

15- Quoted in David Lyon. In Afghanistan (New York: Palgrave, 2009), p. 84

16- <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB325/doc03.pdf0>
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB325/doc03.pdf0

17- <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB325/doc08.pdf>
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB325/doc08.pdf

18- Author's interview with a source with in-depth knowledge about
Afghan-Pakistan affairs.

19-
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/05_02_09afghan_poll_2009.pdf>
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/05_02_09afghan_poll_2009.pdf

20- Author's interview with a source present during that meeting.

21- <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,721110-2,00.html>
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,721110-2,00.html