October 08, 2010 7:42:19 PM
Ashok Malik
Foreign policy commentators in New Delhi and the Generals and strategic
establishment in Rawalpindi-Islamabad are working on the same assumption:
That the American withdrawal from Afghanistan is inevitable, inescapable and
imminent. The Pakistani Generals have been quick on the draw. They have
begun the scramble for a post-withdrawal Kabul even before the Americans have
actually begun their retreat.
In the short term, the Pakistani Afghan strategy has three components.
First, drive the Indians out of Afghan- istan. Second, weaken President Hamid
Karzai. Third, play factional politics within the Afghan Taliban so that
the Haqqani militia, considered closest to the Inter-Services Intelligence,
emerges victorious.
February's attacks on Indian targets in Kabul were a pointer in this
direction. They were believed to have been executed by the Haqqani faction to
further the ISI mission of scaring away Indian economic assistance and
capacity-building efforts.
The Haqqani faction is the ISI's proxy. It has gradually gained primacy
among the various Taliban groups. Mullah Omar's faction — the so-called
Quetta Shura — is being gradually undermined by Islamabad. As per Pakistani
media reports, in a "massive crackdown" nine of 18 key members of the Quetta
Shura have been arrested in the past two months. In the coming weeks,
expect more senior operatives to be 'captured' or 'persuaded' by the ISI to
defect.
Pakistan has trained its guns on the Queeta Shura ever since elements of
it began negotiating with President Karzai's agents. The ISI sees this as
insubordination and seeks absolute control over all Afghan Taliban factions.
Essentially, Pakistan is clearing the ground for a post-Karzai,
post-America power shift in Kabul. It wants the Haqqani faction to
take over, no
questions asked. It has been encouraging American contact with the
Haqqanis for
about a year and will try and present this group as the "good" Taliban or
at least the Taliban the West can work with.
The diminution of Mullah Omar has to be seen in this context. He is too
much of a religious nutcase to understand or play second fiddle to Pakistan's
strategic interests, which are quite independent of any Islamic
projections. In September 2001, Mullah Omar brushed aside the Saudis and the
Pakistanis and refused to hand over Osama bin Laden to the United States. He
preferred risking an American ground invasion instead. The Generals
didn't quite
understand this. True, more and more of the senior ranks of the Pakistan
Army are turning Islamist. Yet, at the very top, the military leadership
remains rational, cut-throat and bloody-minded. It doesn't love
universal jihad
as much as it hates India.
As such, Rawalpindi is not bothered about who is a better theologian and
more suited to imposing Sharia'h-compliant behaviour laws in Afghanistan —
Jalaluddin Haqqani or Mullah Omar. It is more interested in who will serve
it better in re-establishing Pakistan's strategic depth and permitting the
use of Afghanistan for unremitting assault on India as a priority over
terrorist strikes against the West.
It is quite possible the ISI will lose control of Jalaluddin Haqqani — or
his son Sirajuddin — should this wing of the Taliban eventually get to
power in Kabul. Yet, that is a problem for the future. For the moment, the ISI
and Pakistani praetorian guard on the one hand and the Haqqani clan on the
other are in complete synergy.
However, there is one niggling question that remains to be answered: Is it
certain the Americans will go home? In other words, have the Pakistanis
declared victory a bit too early? Despite the recent London Conference on
Afghanistan — where the British Government's advocacy of a deal with the
Taliban seemed to have prevailed, aimed as it was at boosting the Labour Party
before this summer's general election — the final picture remains unclear.
In Washington, DC, there is a compelling battle on between competing wings
of the Obama Administration. One school wants to opt out of Afghanistan
and would prefer to tackle terrorism in the West within a crime-fighting
framework rather than through the prism of a cross-continental
ideological war.
Another section fears an American withdrawal will be a crippling blow to
the superpower and its aura, influence and long-term security. There is
concern that if Osama bin Laden appears on the streets of Kabul a few weeks
after some sort of Taliban take over — and nobody can rule this out, least of
all the ISI — clenches his fists and says "We smashed America", the
consequences will be catastrophic.
That domestic debate in Washington, DC, has not been settled; perhaps it
will never be. What that means is an all-out military assault on the
multiple Taliban regiments, stretched across Afghanistan and
Pakistan, will not
happen. Nobody has the stomach for that and, with the unwillingness of
European allies to commit forces, nobody has the troops either.
Yet, equally, it also means there will be enough pressure on the American
President to not walk away altogether. If nothing else, covert operations
within Pakistani territory could intensify, drone attacks being complemented
by on-ground targeted killings or assassinations. In short, the status quo
may persist longer than a lot of people, especially the Pakistani
Generals, think.
November 2010 could prove a key month for Afghanistan's medium-term
future. Congressional elections are due in the United States and will
take place
exactly midway through President Barack Obama's term. The Democrats are
decidedly nervous and fear the building disappointment with Mr Obama will hand
them a drubbing. The Republicans are smelling blood. This is expected to
be Mr Obama's midterm jolt, just as the Republican triumph in the
Congressional elections of 1994 was Mr Bill Clinton's first-term jolt.
That setback in 1994 converted Mr Clinton from a namby-pamby compromiser
to a realist. What will 2010 mean for Mr Obama? He will have to re-craft his
agenda and branding if he is to rescue his sinking presidency. Doubtless
the economy will remain his, and the voter's, primary concern. However, he
would also want to avoid being labelled the President who ran away from
Afghanistan, didn't give his Generals the men and time they sought and in
effect wrote America's obituary as a global power. By neglecting that
potential
scenario, Pakistan's Generals could be making a fatal miscalculation.
--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear
of punishment and hope of reward after death." --
Albert Einstein !!!
http://www.scribd.com/doc/22151765/History-of-Pakistan-Army-from-1757-to-1971
http://www.scribd.com/doc/21686885/TALIBAN-WAR-IN-AFGHANISTAN
http://www.scribd.com/doc/22455178/Letters-to-Command-and-Staff-College-Quetta-Citadel-Journal
http://www.scribd.com/doc/23150027/Pakistan-Army-through-eyes-of-Pakistani-Generals
http://www.scribd.com/doc/23701412/War-of-Independence-of-1857
http://www.scribd.com/doc/22457862/Pakistan-Army-Journal-The-Citadel
http://www.scribd.com/doc/21952758/1971-India-Pakistan-War
http://www.scribd.com/doc/25171703/BOOK-REVIEWS-BY-AGHA-H-AMIN
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